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Can The Income Tax Be Saved?:  The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Adopting Unitary Formulary Apportionment  




 Governments must raise revenue to provide the services desired by their 
constituents.  Most developed nations raise a substantial portion of the necessary 
revenues through the imposition of corporate and individual income taxes.  But recent 
economic developments, and particularly the increasing globalization of  capital markets, 
has made enforcement of national income taxes increasingly difficult.  The enforcement 
issues go beyond mere tax competition; nations are finding it difficult to collect taxes on 
income that could not be earned anywhere other than within their borders.  A primary 
cause of these difficulties lies in countries’ failure to devise effective methods of taxing 
the domestic income of foreign corporations.  All too often, such income ends up taxed 
nowhere.  Not surprisingly and all too successfully, taxpayers strive to arrange their 
affairs so that their income becomes such nowhere income.  It is hard to see how the 
corporate, and perhaps even the individual income tax can survive as an effective revenue 
raising device unless and until countries devise an effective method of taxing the 
domestic income of foreign corporations. 
One component of many of these tax reduction schemes is the manipulation of 
“transfer prices,” or the prices charged by one corporation for the provision of goods or 
services to  another, related corporation.  By setting such prices unduly high or low, 
taxpayers can change the source or character of income as well as the identity of the 
earning taxpayer.  Although on paper, almost all tax authorities have the right to adjust 
transfer prices to accord with “arm’s length” prices, this has proven exceptionally 
difficult to do in real world situations.  In addition, even accurate pricing often fails solve 
the problem posed by the nontaxation of foreign corporate earners because taxpayers 
have learned to manipulate economically meaningless source rules to locate income in 
low tax jurisdictions.  Increasingly, academics and EU bureaucrats have come to believe 
that the solution to the problem of nontaxation of international income lies in replacing 
the current arm’s length, separate entity based taxing regimes, which rely on transfer 
prices and source rules to determine the amount of income earned by and taxed in the 
hands of domestic operating entities, with unitary formulary taxing regimes similar to 
those used by some states of the United States.  Such unitary formulary regimes would 
use mathematical formulas based on “real economic factors” to divide income among 
members of economically integrated corporate groups and the countries in which they 
operate.   
The paper examines the prospects for success of formulary taxing regimes by 
looking at the experiences of the states of the United States, which have operated such 
regimes. It concludes that switching to a formulary regime will not solve most of the  
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workshops at the University of Chicago Law School and  the University of Toronto Law Faculty  for their 
comments on earlier drafts.  Mistakes remain my own.  Not for quotation or attribution without the author’s 
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problems afflicting the current, arm’s length based system, and further, that taxpayers 
will expand the use techniques developed to avoid  the reach of the subpart F regime to 







 Governments must raise revenue to provide the services desired by their 
constituents.  Most developed nations raise a substantial portion of the necessary 
revenues through the imposition of corporate and individual income taxes.1  But recent 
economic developments, and particularly the increasing globalization of  capital markets, 
has made enforcement of national income taxes increasingly difficult.  These 
enforcement issues go beyond mere tax competition;2 nations are finding it difficult to 
collect taxes on income that could not be earned anywhere other than within their 
borders.3  A primary cause of these difficulties lies in countries’ failure to devise 
effective methods of taxing the domestic income of foreign corporations. All too often, 
such income ends up taxed nowhere.  
It is hard to see how the corporate, and perhaps even the individual income tax 
can survive as an effective revenue raising device unless and until countries devise an 
effective method of taxing the domestic income of foreign corporations. The failure to tax 
the domestic income of foreign corporations undercuts countries’ ability to tax domestic 
corporations and individuals in two different ways.  First, it is politically difficult and 
perhaps economically self destructive to tax domestic corporations on their domestic 
income at rates substantially higher than those faced by foreign competitors engaged in 
similar activities in the same country.  When countries succeed in collecting such taxes, 
domestic corporations are at an economic disadvantage relative to those competitors, 
offering investors lower returns, having less capital for expansion, and having less room 
                                                 
1 Although wage taxes (such as social security taxes) and value added taxes (outside the United States) are 
also very significant sources of revenue, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and 
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1621 (2000); William B. Barker, Optimal 
International Taxation and Tax Competition:  Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
161, 166 (2002),  personal and corporate income taxes remain important revenue sources.  See id., at 166. 
2 Tax competition is just part of a larger competition for “mobile capital.”  Because countries gain any time 
they attract investment generating local benefits in excess of local costs, they may “bid” for such 
investments by reducing taxes, providing subsidies, or decreasing regulatory burdens. See Julie Roin, 
Competition and Evasion:  Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L. J.  543, 560 
(2001). Though such bidding, like all price competitions, can have beneficial allocative effects, such 
competition can also be a source of concern for those who worry that the governments doing the bidding 
will mistake the costs and benefits (or the mobility) of the investments at issue or the ability of 
governments to raise sufficient funds from other sources.  See id. at 562.  Others worry that much 
competition takes place between similarly situated countries, resulting in (from the governments’ 
perspective) a prisoner’s dilemma and a reallocation of locational rents from governments and nonmobile 
taxpayers to owners of mobile capital.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1583.  
3 For example, while manufacturing activities and their accompanying income often can be moved to other 
jurisdictions, the same cannot be said of sales made to residents of a jurisdiction.  Yet profitable companies 
with considerable U.S. sales activities often pay relatively little U.S. tax. See infra Part II (outlining tax 
avoidance devices). 
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for price concessions.4  But countries rarely succeed in collecting such taxes for long 
because domestic corporations—and domestic investors--learn to use tax favored foreign 
corporations to avoid domestic taxation.  This is the second way the undertaxation of 
foreign corporations undercuts countries’ ability to levy an income tax, by encouraging 
and facilitating tax avoidance.  Taxpayers divert income away from domestic 
corporations and into related foreign corporations; or they transform domestic 
corporations into foreign corporations through recapitalizations, reorganizations or 
mergers with foreign corporations.  Investors cease creating and investing in domestic 
entities, choosing instead to utilize foreign entities.   When foreign corporations can reap 
the benefits of operating in and selling to customers located in high tax jurisdictions 
without payment of substantial income taxes, over time one should expect virtually all 
domestic investments in high tax countries to be made through such tax favored foreign 
corporations. 
Even with political will,5 high tax countries face significant practical impediments 
in taxing such income. One component of many of the current tax reduction schemes is 
the manipulation of “transfer prices,” or the prices charged by one corporation for the 
provision of goods or services to  another, related corporation.  By setting such prices 
unduly high or low, taxpayers can change the source or character of income as well as the 
identity of the earning taxpayer.  Although on paper, almost all tax authorities have the 
right to adjust transfer prices to accord with “arm’s length” prices, this has proven 
exceptionally difficult to do in real world situations.  In addition, even accurate pricing 
often fails solve the problem posed by the nontaxation of foreign corporate earners 
because of weaknesses in the rules determining the source of income.  Increasingly, 
academics6 and EU bureaucrats7 have come to believe that the solution to the problem of 
                                                 
4 Whether foreign corporations would utilize their tax advantages for competitive reasons is unclear.  They 
may prefer simply to enjoy their higher after-tax return and distribute higher dividends.  See Michael S. 
Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Econ. Research Paper 
No. 06-28, pp. 33-34 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=953074 . 
5 Serious question exists as to whether high tax countries actually want to impose taxes on foreign 
investors, including foreign businesses.  Though such taxation is at least superficially popular, some fear 
that taxation will drive foreign investors and investment to lower tax jurisdictions.  This fear of driving 
away foreign investment was among the justifications for removing the withholding tax from portfolio 
interest income in the U.S. in 1984, and remains a concern in many other countries.  See STAFF OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1984 391 (“Congress believed it important that U.S. businesses have access to the 
Eurobond market as a source of capital”); Suzanne Walsh, Taxation of Cross-Border Interest Flows:  The 
Promises and Failures of the European Union Approach, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251, 251-252 
(2005) (“Wealthier, industrialized countries...hesitate to abandon advantageous tax practices, particularly 
bank secrecy, that protect their capital markets and financial sectors”).   Of course, foreign investment in 
one country could be domestic investment in another country; to a large extent the favorable tax treatment 
of “foreign investment” merely encourages investors to invest in any country other than their own.  The 
favorable treatment of foreign investment thus can be viewed as an example of a classic prisoners’ 
dilemma.  Alternatively, conspiracy theorists may analyze the situation in principal-agent terms:  the 
political class has been using obscure tax rules to lower the effective rate of tax on their patrons, the largest 
companies and wealthiest taxpayers. I have no interest in arguing as to which of these two (or some other) 
characterizations is more “correct”; this article is instead oriented towards the question of whether a 
different outcome is possible if the affected polities desire one.   
6 See, e.g., JOANN MARTENS-WEINER, COMPANY TAX REFORM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:  GUIDANCE FROM 
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ON IMPLEMENTING FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT IN THE EU (Springer 
2006), at 9 (“From a tax administration point of view, although it may not guarantee a ‘correct’ profit 
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nontaxation of international income lies in replacing the current arm’s length, separate 
entity based taxing regimes, which rely on transfer prices to determine the amount of 
income earned by and taxed in the hands of domestic operating entities, with unitary 
formulary taxing regimes similar to those used by some states of the United States.  
These unitary formulary regimes use mathematical formulas based on “real economic 
factors” to divide income among members of economically integrated corporate groups.  
Essentially, such methods disregard the separate existence of related corporate entities, 
allocating their collective income among affected countries based on each country’s 
relative contribution of identifiable economic factors.   States in the United States use 
formulary methods to apportion the income derived from multistate enterprises;8 their 
                                                                                                                                                 
allocation in the traditional sense, formulary apportionment appears better suited to avoid double taxation 
problems in the EU than the arm’s length transfer pricing system.”); Reuven Avi-Yonah, A Proposal to 
Adopt Formulary Apportionment For Corporate Income Taxation,               (“Under our proposal, the U.S. tax 
base for multinational corporations would be calculated based on a fraction of their worldwide income. This fraction 
would simply be the share of their worldwide sales that occur in the United States.”); Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Rise 
and Fall of Arm’s Length:  A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV.  89,  
159 (1995) (“The next step is for the United States to propose discussions on the adoption of formulary 
techniques along the lines suggested above.”);  R.M. Bird and D.J.S. Brean, The Interjurisdictional 
Allocation of Income and the Unitary Taxation Debate, 34 CAN. TAX J. 1377, 1412  (1986) (“While the 
accepted international approach has the considerable political advantage of (apparently) not requiring 
formal agreement on the division of the tax base, it is not clear that this arrangement will long endure”); 
Marcel Gerard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, A Tentative 
Appraisal, CESifo Working Paper No. 1795, http://www.SSRN.com/abstract=935009 (2006); Walter 
Hellerstein and Charles E. McClure, Jr., The European Commission’s Report on Company Income 
Taxation:  What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 199, 
218  (2004), Paul McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49 TAX. L. REV.  
691,738 (1994); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm’s Length 
Principle with Formulary Apportionment, 56 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOC. 586, 599 (2002).   
7 In 2001 and again in 2003, the European Commission proposed replacing the current rules for the taxation 
of EU source income of multinational companies with a formulary system operating on a commonly 
defined, consolidated income base.  See European Commission, An Internal Market without Company Tax 
Obstacles, Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges, COM(2003)726 final; European 
Commission, Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles-A Strategy for Providing Companies 
With a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-wide Activities:  Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee , 
COM(2001)582 final.  Though the European Commission’s enthusiasm for moving away from the current 
practice of relying on arm’s length pricing standards and separate entity accounting was not initially shared 
by many member governments, decisions by the European Court of Justice striking down critical parts of  
national tax regimes as “discriminatory” or otherwise in violation of terms of the Treaty of Rome have led 
some commentators to conclude that some sort of EU wide formulary tax system is inevitable.  See Joe 
Kirwin, ECJ’s Advocate General Rejects U.K. Denial of Subsidiary Losses, 67 DAILY TAX REP’T  G-4, G-5 
(2005) (EU commission official stated “We have been warning member states for some years that it was 
crucial to move towards harmonizing various aspects of corporate taxation laws...We have indicated that if 
this did not happen through legislation it would happen through court rulings.”); Bengt Ljung, EU’s Kovacs 
Urges U.K. to Agree on Corporate Tax Harmonization, 118 DAILY TAX REP’T  G-7, G-8 (2005) (“At the 
European Parliament, the tax commissioner claimed an increasing number of member states are supporting 
a harmonization of the company tax base.  Of the 25 countries, ‘maybe five’ are still reluctant”); Lee A. 
Sheppard, Dowdy Retailer Set to Destroy European Corporate Tax, Part 2, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 627, 632-
633 (2005) (“This case is a fork in the road for the corporate income tax.  The choices are repeal of the 
corporate income tax, with or without replacement, or mandatory worldwide combination of all controlled 
entities.”).  
8 Such methods are also used to allocate corporate income among the Canadian provinces, see JOANN 
MARTENS-WEINER, supra note 6, at 2, and some European nations have also experimented with formulary 
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methods allow each state to tax the percentage of the taxpayer’s income corresponding to 
the proportion of  that taxpayer’s overall sales, payroll and property located within the 
state.  The idea is to use the lessons of that (not altogether happy) experience to develop a 
version capable of dealing with multinational income to be implemented at the national 
(or international) level. 
 Replacing the current international tax rules with a system of unitary formulary 
taxation would entail tremendous institutional and transition costs in the U.S. and 
elsewhere.9  Further, maintaining the degree of legal uniformity necessary for such a 
system to operate to its full potential would have its own costs.10 Ultimately, the question 
is whether the gains likely to be generated from adoption of such a system would 
outweigh these costs.  Skepticism is warranted because many of the avoidance techniques 
honed by use under the current tax rules will be just as effective at defeating attempts to 
tax under unitary formulary methods of taxation.  Stated simply, many of the real 
economic factors are no more real, or less susceptible to manipulation, than the are the 
factors used to determine source of income under the current arm’s length based system.  
Further, techniques honed by taxpayers to avoid the reach of the current subpart F rules 
will work to frustrate the intended purpose of moving from a separate entity to a unitary 
system for the taxation of groups of related corporations. Thus, much potential tax 
revenue will likely continue to escape even from a carefully crafted and widely adopted 
unitary formulary tax system.  This is not a conclusion I am happy to reach because it is 
not accompanied by any belief in the reparability of the current “system” for the taxation 
of income derived from international transactions.  But it is a conclusion worth putting 
forward because it makes no sense to spend the time, effort and political goodwill 
necessary to put unitary formulary taxation into practice if it will not save the income tax. 
     This article is divided into four parts.  Part I describes the current U.S. rules for 
the taxation of the domestic income of foreign taxpayers, including foreign corporations.  
Although these rules are unique in some respects, they are close enough to the tax rules 
prevailing in other jurisdictions to serve as a representative model of developed country  
regimes for the taxation of foreign investors.  Part II explains the devices taxpayers have 
used to avoid taxation under those rules and the ineffectiveness of the current 
countermeasures taken by the government, or proposed by commentators, to stem this tax 
avoidance.  Part III explores the operation of unitary, formulary tax systems and their 
weaknesses.  Part IV concludes. 
 
I.  Current U.S. Rules for the Taxation of Income from International Transactions  
 The U.S., like most countries, asserts jurisdiction to tax based on both residence 
and source.  U.S. persons, including U.S. corporations, are subject to tax on their 
worldwide income, while foreign persons are subject to U.S. tax on all income derived 
from sources within the U.S.  However, this jurisdiction is not exercised to the maximum 
extent allowed.  Taxation of much of the foreign sourced income earned by U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxation.  See Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 7, at 632-634 (briefly describing limited experiments in 
Denmark, France, and Italy). 
9 See Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. OF LEGAL STUD. S61, S78-84 (2002) (detailing 
institutional impediments to development of a common income tax base). 
10 See Julie Roin, Can Income from Capital Be Taxed?  An International Perspective, in TAXING CAPITAL 
INCOME (Brookings Institution, forthcoming 2007). 
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taxpayers is deferred,11 while substantial amounts of the U.S. source income of foreign 
taxpayers is exempted from U.S. tax by statute12 or treaty.13  The critical dividing line in 
the case of foreign taxpayers is between business income and investment income.  
Business income is more likely to be taxed at source than investment income. 
 
 A.  The Taxation of Business Income 
 Under statutory law, the U.S. taxes the income of a foreign taxpayer engaged in a 
U.S. trade or business as it does the income of a domestic taxpayer.14  All taxpayers are 
taxable on the net income generated by such business activities.  Taxation thus turns on  
whether or not  a foreign taxpayer’s activities rise to the level of a “trade or business.”  
However, when a taxpayer is a resident of a country with which the U.S. has a tax treaty, 
the predicate for taxation is somewhat higher; the taxpayer must have a “permanent 
establishment” in the U.S. before its business related income becomes taxable in the 
U.S.15  And even then, only the income “attributable” to that permanent establishment is 
so taxable.16  Though the exact contours of a permanent establishment can be uncertain, 
and moreover may vary from treaty to treaty, a taxpayer generally must have an office or 
other fixed place of business in which it engages in activities other than the purchase of 
goods.17  The taxpayer must engage in selling or manufacturing or other income 
producing activities at the location; then and only then does the income attributable to 
those activities become taxable in the U.S.18 
                                                 
11 Technically, taxation is deferred when the U.S. taxpayer earns the foreign income indirectly, through an 
intermediate foreign corporation.  The U.S. does not tax this foreign corporation because it is neither a 
resident of, nor earns income from, the United States.  With some exceptions, the U.S. shareholder(s) of 
such foreign corporations, like shareholders of domestic corporations, do not have to include any portion of 
its income in their own incomes unless and until the foreign corporation distributes a dividend or the U.S. 
shareholder sells its shares in the foreign corporation. 
12 The U.S. imposes a 30% withholding tax on the gross amount of certain, limited categories of foreigners’ 
investment income, see I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a), and taxes any net income “effectively connected with the 
conduct of a trade or business within the United States.”  I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a).  These statutory rules 
explicitly rule out the taxation at source of “portfolio interest income,” interest paid by an unrelated U.S. 
debtor, see I.R.C. §§ 871(h) & 881(c), as well as any nonbusiness income falling outside the definition of 
“fixed, determinable, annual or periodical” income.  See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1).  The latter 
exclusion covers almost all nonbusiness gains from the sale of property, see Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(a)(1),  
insurance premiums, and other income items with substantial associated costs.  See Rev. Rul. 80-222, 
1980-2 C.B.  211.  
13 Tax treaties typically reduce or eliminate the withholding tax otherwise imposed on investment income, 
see CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 209 (3d ed. 2006), while increasing  the 
nexus requirement for the taxation of a foreigner’s business income. Id. at 165. 
14 See I.R.C. §§ 871(b) (imposing tax on effectively connected income “as provided in section 1 or 55”), 
882(a) (imposing tax on effectively connected income “as provided in section 11, 55, 59A, or 1201(a)”). 
15 United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, Art. 7.1.  This provision of the  
U.S. Model Treaty is identical to its counterpart in the OECD Model Treaty.  See OECD Model  Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital, January 28, 2003, Art. 7.1.   
16 U.S. Model Treaty, supra,  at Art. 7. 2; OECD Model Tax Convention, supra, at Art. 7.2. 
17 U.S. Model Treaty, supra,  at Art. 5; United States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the 
United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, at p. 15 (“the term means a fixed 
place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”); OECD 
Model Tax Convention, supra, at  Art. 5. 
18 Most treaties contain a long list of “preparatory” or “auxiliary” activities that a foreign taxpayer can carry 
out through a fixed place of business without causing that fixed place of business to be deemed a 
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 Since corporations, by definition, can only act through agents, an important 
question for the operation of these rules is the extent to which affiliates operating in the 
U.S. become mere agents of the (formally distinct) foreign corporations, so that the 
activities and offices of the U.S. entity can be imputed to the foreign corporation.  Such 
imputation brings with it, of course, jurisdiction to tax the foreign entity which may itself 
have no other office or business dealings inside the U.S.  Both the Internal Revenue 
Code19 and treaties20 contain provisions which make it relatively easy for foreign 
corporations to treat even related U.S. corporations as nonagent, independent contractors, 
thus avoiding implication in those corporations’ U.S. business activities.  As a result, 
many foreign corporations can avoid U.S. taxation even on their U.S. sourced income 
and, assuming foreign, residence based taxes are lower than U.S. taxes on such income in 
the hands of the U.S. affiliates would have been, their owners have an economic 
incentive to shift income from the U.S. corporations to their foreign affiliates.  
 
 B.  The Taxation of Investment Income 
 Under statutory law, the U.S. subjects some forms of investment income to a  
withholding tax equal to 30 percent of the gross income amount of such income, while  
other forms of investment income are exempt from tax.  To some extent, this 
dichotomous treatment  tracks administrative and fairness concerns.  Most gains earned 
by nonbusiness taxpayers are exempted from source tax because the imposition of a tax 
based on gross sales receipts seems likely to lead to overtaxation, buyers are unlikely to 
know their sellers’ basis making withholding based on net income impossible21, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“permanent establishment.”  See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, Art. 
5. 4. 
19 See I.R.C. §864(c)(5) (agent’s office or fixed place of business disregarded unless “such agent  has the 
authority to negotiate and conclude contracts in the name of the nonresident alien individual or foreign 
corporation and regularly exercises that authority or has a stock of merchandise from which he regularly 
fills orders on behalf of such individual or foreign corporation, and (ii) is not a general commission agent, 
broker, or other agent of independent status acting in the ordinary course of his business”).  Technically, 
this imputation rule applies only for purposes of determining whether the taxpayer has “an office or fixed 
place of business in the U.S.” rather than whether the taxpayer has a “trade or business” in the U.S.  
However, a taxpayer engaged in a U.S. trade or business is only taxable in the U.S. on that business’s 
“effectively connected income” and it is relatively simple for most taxpayers to avoid creating “effectively 
connected income” when they do not have an “office or fixed place of business.”   
20 See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, Art. 5. 7 (“The fact that a 
company that is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of 
the other Contracting State, or that carries on business in that other State...shall not be taken into account in 
determining whether either company has a permanent establishment in that other State.”), Art. 5.5 
(imputing permanent establishment only where a dependent agent “has and habitually exercises in a 
Contracting State an authority to conclude contracts that are binding on the enterprise”), and Art. 5.6 
(disregarding permanent establishments of “a broker, general commission agent, or any other agent of an 
independent status, provided that such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their business as 
independent agents”).  Again, these provisions are consistent with the provisions of the OECD model 
treaty.  See OECD Model Tax Convention, Art. 5.5 – 5.7.   
21 Congress has provided an exception to this general rules of nontaxation for real estate gains.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 897, 1445 (taxing real estate gains as trade or business income, but effectuating taxing scheme through 
withholding of portion of gross sales proceeds).  Whether such a tax regime could be enforced in other 
contexts, with property subject to less formal transfer mechanisms and perhaps greater susceptibility to 
replacement by derivative contracts is unclear.  Although many countries levy value added taxes on a 
border-adjustable basis, value added taxes are imposed on gross receipts, rather than being tied in any way 
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obstacles to enforcement of a net income tax on nonresidents with limited contacts in the 
U.S. are substantial.22   But some of the exemptions stem from political decisions.  
“Portfolio interest income,” that is, interest paid to taxpayers unrelated to the U.S. debtor, 
was exempted from the withholding tax in 1984 in order to encourage foreign investors to 
supply cheap capital to U.S. enterprises.23 
 Tax treaties further reduce source taxation of investment income, in many cases 
eliminating the withholding tax otherwise due on interest, royalties, and dividend income 
received by residents of the treaty partner.24  Since these treaties are reciprocal in form, in 
theory these treaty reductions merely substitute increases in residence taxation for 
decreases in source taxation; in actuality, as discussed in more detail below, often the 
result is no taxation of this income by any country.25 
 The analysis in this paper focuses largely on the defects in the taxation of 
business, rather than investment, income.  However the two categories of income are not 
wholly distinct.  The active business income of one corporation can be transformed into 
“passive” investment income of a related corporation through the use of intercorporate 
interest or royalty payments.  Moreover, there is some fluidity between the bases of the 
corporate and personal income taxes; as rates of personal income tax go down (whether 
because of statutory decreases or easier access to avoidance mechanisms), some income 
tends to shift from corporations to individuals and visa versa.  
 
II.  Avoidance Techniques and Attempted Countermeasures 
Though there may be as many different tax schemes as there are taxpayers, a 
remarkable number are variations on one, relatively simple pattern:  income earned from 
products or services that are manufactured, produced or sold (and sometimes all three) in 
high tax jurisdictions is diverted to a foreign corporation, the income of which is taxable 
neither by the source nor by the residence country.  Source country tax is avoided either 
because such taxation is precluded by treaty or the income is derived in exempt form; 
residence country taxation is avoided by locating the corporate entity in a “tax haven” 
jurisdiction.26  To take one simple example, a company, P,  that makes widgets may 
create a subsidiary, S1, to perform the actual manufacturing in high tax country A.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
to an income measurement.  Part III.C.2.d  infra discusses whether a gross receipts tax would be an 
acceptable source-based income tax.    
22Taxing authorities have little in the way of extraterritorial power; indeed, as a general rule their agents are 
not allowed to operate abroad.  Further, although foreign governments may provide some assistance with 
auditing and collection activities under the terms of tax treaties, for the most part, noncooperation is the 
rule.    
23See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 391 (“Congress believed that the 
imposition of a withholding tax on portfolio interest paid on debt obligations issued by U.S. persons might 
impair the ability of U.S. corporations to raise capital in the Eurobond market.”). 
24 See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, Art. 11, ¶ 1 (providing that 
“Interest arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State 
may be taxed only in that other State.”); id. at Art. 12, ¶ 1 (same for royalties “arising in a Contracting State 
and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State”); id. at  Art. 10 (limiting source 
country taxation on dividends to 5 or 15% of gross dividend income depending on degree of ownership by 
dividend recipient).  
25 For a more complete exposition of this thesis, see Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic 
World With Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1995). 
26 A country may constitute a “tax haven” either because it levies no, or low income taxes generally, or 
because it operates a “territorial  tax system,” and excludes foreign sourced income from its tax base.   
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widgets cost $60 to produce.  S1 sells the widgets for $62 to a related company, S2, 
which is resident in a tax haven jurisdiction B.  S2 sells the widgets for $80 to S3, yet 
another related company resident in the U.S.  S3 distributes the widgets throughout the 
U.S. market, selling them to unrelated U.S. customers at an average of $90, after 
incurring expenses of about $5 per widget.  S1’s profit of $1 per widget is taxable in A.  
S3’s profit of $5 per widget is taxable in the U.S.  But S2’s profit of $21 per widget is 
taxable only in B, a country which by definition levies very little tax.  It is not taxable in 
A because none of S2’s income is derived from A; all it does in A (if it does anything at 
all) is purchase goods there.  S2’s income is not taxable in the U.S. because it is not 
engaged in a trade or business in the U.S. nor does it have an office or fixed place of 
business in the U.S.; even if the gains from S2’s sale of widgets would be sourced in the 
U.S. under the U.S. source rules, the gains would be exempt from the withholding tax.  
These results are particularly galling when, as is often the case, S2 is a mere shell 
corporation, with few employees or activities to justify its reaping the lion’s share of the 
income generated by the corporate group.   
The U.S., like most high tax countries, has tried to attack such schemes, both 
through administrative actions, legislative enactments and renegotiation of tax treaty 
terms.  However, as described in greater detail below, taxpayers have managed to keep 
one step ahead of the U.S. and other governments.  At best, taxing authorities have found 
themselves engaged in a never-ending game of “whack-a-mole”; more often they appear 
to be looking on helplessly as the moles eat the produce in the garden and move 
inexorably closer to the foundations of the house.   
 
A.  Transfer Pricing 
The tax avoidance scheme outlined above works only when the widget prices 
used by the taxpayer in the transfers between S1, S2 and S3 are accepted as legitimate for 
purposes of calculating the taxable income of the affected corporations.  Under the laws 
of most countries, the terms of transfers between related parties must approximate “arms 
length” terms; that is, the prices used must be the same as those that would be charged 
unrelated purchasers of the goods or services involved.  If the transfer prices do not meet 
this arms length standard, the tax authorities may step in and reprice transactions for 
purposes of computing the affected taxpayers’ tax obligations.  Both U.S. statutory law27 
and treaty provisions28 allow tax authorities to “adjust” the income, deductions, credits 
and other tax attributes to bring the tax results of related party transactions into 
conformity with the results that would have followed from the use of arms length pricing 
terms.  But conferring this power on tax authorities is easy.  Tax authorities have found it 
remarkably difficult to effectively exercise this power. 
One problem is that few intercompany transfers involve fungible items with 
clearly defined market prices.29  As a result, it is very hard to identify comparable 
transactions taking place between unrelated parties to serve as the third party standard.  
                                                 
27 See I.R.C. § 482. 
28 See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, Art. 9 (Associated Enterprises); 
OECD Model Income Tax Convention, Art. 9. 
29 As early as the 1970’s, government reports showed that only about 3 percent of transfer pricing disputes 
relied on “comparable uncontrolled transactions” as a basis for making transfer price adjustments.  See 
Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 TAX NOTES  625, 657 (1986).  
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Intellectual property that is both unique and difficult to value, ranging from trademarks, 
to patents, marketing intangibles, or goodwill, infects almost every transaction. At best, 
taxpayers and tax authorities find themselves relying on loosely similar transactions, and 
then arguing about the type and extent of corrections necessary to make the price terms 
reasonably comparable. 
Not only is the end of such pricing disputes in much doubt, but the process of 
reaching that end is burdensome in the extreme for both governments and the affected 
taxpayers.  Transfer pricing disputes often degenerate into very expensive contests of 
dueling experts, sapping the resources of both taxpayers and tax authorities.30  Though 
one might think that the prospect of being embroiled in such a dispute would lead 
taxpayers to use conservative pricing assumptions, the corresponding inability of tax 
authorities to challenge more than an infinitesimal proportion of related party transactions 
seems to encourage taxpayers to play the audit lottery.   
The U.S. also utilizes a tool developed to combat other forms of tax avoidance to 
try to stem transfer pricing abuses.  It now encourages taxpayers to justify their transfer 
prices or transfer price methodology in advance of entering into related party 
transactions.31  The hope is twofold:  first, that the discipline of the justification process 
will prevent gross overreaching by taxpayers and second, that forcing taxpayers to make 
pricing choices at least somewhat in ignorance of actual business outcomes will 
somewhat constrain their ability to pick tax minimizing transfer prices.32  Whether this 
tool will be worth the substantial costs imposed on taxpayers (whether overreaching or 
not) remains open to debate.  Hindsight is not necessary in many cases to determine the 
tax minimizing transfer price strategy, and the corresponding justification for the desired 
results often not difficult to construct.  
Not only is such intellectual property extraordinarily difficult to value,33 but 
taxpayers have learned to transfer ownership of such property, and thus the associated 
income, to foreign corporations over which the source county has limited taxing 
jurisdiction.34  Such property, which typically lacks physical existence, is eminently 
moved through paper transactions.  Nor is intellectual property the only intangible whose 
                                                 
30 See  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6 , at  151(“For the vast majority of taxpayers, the result [of 
traditional arm’s length standard] is years of uncertainty before a case can be settled or litigated.”);  Stanley 
I. Langbein, supra note 29, at 627 (“the rules create considerable uncertainty and administrative burden”); 
Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation:  Advance Pricing Agreements and the Struggle 
to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. OF INT’L LAW  144, 145 (2000) (“there has 
developed a national, and even international consensus that traditional mechanisms for administering the 
law and resolving disputes have virtually collapsed in the area of transfer pricing”). 
31 Taxpayers can avoid risking  imposition of  the  “substantial understatement” penalties contained in 
I.R.C. § 6662(e), should they be on the losing end of a transfer pricing dispute,  by meeting the 
“contemporaneous transfer pricing documentation” requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii).   
These penalties are substantial, ranging from 20 to 40 percent of the amount of any tax understatement.  
See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 421-422 (2003). 
32 See T.D. 8519, 1994-1 C.B. 298 , 299 (1994) (Preamble to Temporary Regulations promulgated under 
authority of I.R.C. § 6662(e)).  
33 See Charles E. McClure, Jr., U.S. Federal Use of Formula Apportionment to Tax Income from 
Intangibles, 14 TAX NOTES INT’L 859, 859 (1997). 
34 See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, Wearing on the Green:  Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. 
and Europe; Tech and Drug Firms Move Key Intellectual Property To Low-Levy Island Haven; Center of 
Windows Licensing, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 7, 2005, at A-1.  
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ownership can be (and often is) manipulated for tax purposes.  It is not clear, as a 
theoretical matter, which member of a group of related entities is entitled to reap the 
benefits of more traditional, and possibly less unique, location factors, such as unusual 
market or supply opportunities:  should the resulting gains be allocated to the entity 
located in the location with the special factor, the entity whose employees identified the 
existence of the special factor, or should the special gains be distributed among all 
participating entities?35  Given this uncertainty, taxpayers usually take pains to ensure 
that these “assets” and associated gains are assigned to entities resident in low tax 
jurisdictions.  Finally, it is unclear how to allocate gains generated by vertical integration 
among vertically integrated entities.36   
The limited prospects for success of direct attacks on transfer price abuses and 
intangibles allocation has led governments to adopt other, more indirect methods of 
controlling tax avoidance activities.  One such technique is to reduce the tax effectiveness 
of foreign corporations, either by redefining those corporations as domestic corporations 
subject to domestic tax on world wide income or by taxing the domestic shareholder of 
those corporations on their share of the corporate earnings on a current basis.  These 
techniques, and the ways taxpayers have bypassed them, are discussed in the next section. 
 
B.  Domesticating Foreign Corporations 
One of the problems with the current U.S. tax rules is that they make it very easy 
for taxpayers to form foreign corporations such as S2 to be used in tax minimization 
schemes.  The residence of natural persons, not surprisingly, is generally determined by 
their physical location—either by their personal abode or by the location of their 
workplace.37  Although some people divide their time among so many jurisdictions that it 
becomes difficult to discern their primary affiliation, relatively few problems arise in 
determining the residence of natural persons.  The residence of corporations, however, is 
another matter entirely.  The U.S., like most countries, as a general rule determines 
corporate residence on the basis of where the company is incorporated,38 which 
                                                 
35 See Richard Vann, Problems in International Division of the Business Income Tax Base,    (linking 
source allocations to Coase’s theory of firm value). 
36 See  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 148-149  (“This residual, the result of the interaction among 
the constituent parts of the organization, cannot be assigned to any component.  Any transfer pricing rule 
which arbitrarily assigns the residual to one part of the organization distorts economic reality.”); Stanley 
Langbein, supra note 29, at 669 (“[I]n a system in which hierarchy has displaced a market form, the net 
revenue (return) to the entire system will exceed at least the apparent aggregate of the individual  revenues 
imputable to the components under any kind of marginal costing notions.”); Note, Multinational 
Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV, L. REV.  
1202, 1215 (1976) (“In economic theory, affiliates of a MNC would not necessarily be expected to treat 
other affiliates as wholly separate corporations or to choose arm’s length prices for their transfers, since 
affiliation may give rise to a variety of synergistic effects which alter the costs and benefits of transacting 
intercompany business....”). 
37 See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(30), 7701(b).  The U.S. looks at residency rights as well as physical residence, 
including within its definition of U.S. resident both U.S. citizens, wherever physically resident, and 
possessors of U.S. “green cards” or permits for “lawful permanent residence.” 
38 See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4).  In the late 1990’s and early years of the 21st century, some U.S. multinationals 
entered into “inversion transactions” to turn themselves into foreign multinationals.  See Michael S. Kirsch, 
The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations:  The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in 
the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 477 n.1 (2005) (listing transactions).  In 
a typical inversion transaction, shareholders of the U.S. parent corporation exchange their shares for shares 
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essentially is a function of where its incorporators choose to file the incorporation papers.  
Although some serious, non-tax legal consequences, such as the extent of shareholder 
rights, can be determined by the country of incorporation,39 the contours of an acceptable 
corporate law regime are fairly well known and relatively noncontroversial.40  As a result, 
many countries have adopted legal regimes acceptable both to investors and corporate 
management.  In particular, such regimes can be adopted by low tax countries anxious to 
serve as tax havens for large multinational companies and investors.41  There are, in 
short, many locales willing and able to serve as S2’s country of residence.42  The costs of 
                                                                                                                                                 
in a newly formed foreign subsidiary resident in a tax haven jurisdiction.  That foreign subsidiary then 
becomes the new parent corporation. Id. at 478 fn.2.  Congress responded by enacting  IRC § 7874  as part 
of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. See id. at 483. This section of the Code disregards inversion 
transactions in which shareholders of the old U.S. corporation constitute more than 80 percent of the 
shareholders of the new foreign parent and continues to treat the foreign parent as a U.S. corporation for tax 
purposes.  See  I.R.C. § 7874(b).  Where between 60 and 80 percent of the shareholder groups overlap, the 
foreign parent is respected as a foreign entity, but the gain generated by the inversion transaction cannot be 
offset by tax attributes of the U.S. corporation, nor are any associated transactions eligible for 
nonrecognition treatment for 10 years following the inversion transaction.  See I.R.C. §§ 7874(a), 
7874(d)(2)(A).  In addition, some types of  intellectual property income earned by the foreign parent 
remains subject to U.S. taxing jurisdiction.  Id. §7874(d)(2)(B). However, the section has no impact on 
corporations which start out as foreign corporations, nor on transactions in which the old shareholders own 
less than 50 percent of the new parent, nor when the new parent carries out substantial business operations 
in its country of incorporation.  In January, 2007, Senators Dorgan, Levin and Feingold introduced a bill 
that would extend the approach of the anti-inversion rules by treating as domestic corporations all 
“controlled foreign corporations” incorporated in one of forty identified “tax haven countries.”  See  Alison 
Bennett, Momentum Increasing for Tax Haven Limits As Budget Writers Eye Dorgan Bill for Offset, 56 
DAILY TAX REP’T  G-5, G-5 (2007).  Like the original anti-inversion rules, the rules contained in the new 
bill would affect new multinationals originally incorporated outside the U.S., nor foreign corporations 
otherwise falling outside the definition of a “controlled foreign corporation.”  
39 See Michael S. Kirsch, supra note 38, at 552-556 (detailing controversy over changes in shareholder 
rights resulting from inversion transactions); David Cay Johnston, Bermuda Move May Sound Good, But 
Investors Could Get Burned, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at C-1 (same). 
40The states of the United States have had no difficulty copying Delaware’s statute, for example.  See 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Simplification of the Criteria for Good Corporate Law or Why Corporate Law Is 
Not As Important Anymore,  2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 35, 36  (2005) (consensus has led to “the notable 
convergence of U.S. corporate laws”).  The European tradition is different, but more in its choice of  means 
than of the ends to which their laws are directed.  See Sophie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law 
Between the United States and Continental Europe:  Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL.  J. CORP. L. 697, 763 
(2005) (investor protection achieved by giving shareholders greater influence over management decisions).  
41These rights can also be provided by private contract.  At least one commentator has suggested that the 
New York Stock Exchange require foreign corporations seeking to list on that exchange meet the corporate 
governance standards set for domestic corporations; at present, foreign corporations are subject to lower 
standards.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?:  The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1830 (2002). 
However, others are advocating further lowering the listing standards for foreign companies. See Floyd 
Norris, High and Low Finance; Should U.S. Markets Be Wide Open?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at C1.   
42 Some have suggested that high tax countries buy off tax haven countries by entering into “tax flight” 
treaties.  See Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax, 58 HASTINGS L.J. ___ (forthcoming 
2007).  Such proposals run into a number of practical obstacles.  One is that  it may be impossible to get the 
high tax countries to agree on how to split the costs of obtaining such treaties.  Another is that the list of tax 
haven countries is not stable—over time, countries can and have added themselves to (and less frequently 
subtracted themselves from) the list.  And as old, established tax haven countries are bought out, the 
benefits to the remaining tax haven countries will increase, attracting new tax haven entrants.  Not all 
countries can become tax havens of course; enacting the “right” laws is not enough if a country is generally 
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setting up an S2 in most of these jurisdictions is quite low, especially relative to the 
amount of taxes saved. 
Some countries have tried to attack the problem of tax haven entities by adopting 
less formal, and hopefully less manipulable, definitions of corporate residency than the 
“place of incorporation” rule.  Britain, for example, determines corporate residency in 
part on the basis of its country of “effective management and control.” 43 However, in 
actual practice, that rule often has come to mean that corporate residency depends on 
where a company holds its board of directors’ meetings, and where it has its primary 
bank account.44  Neither presents much of a barrier to tax avoidance; most directors are 
happy to spend a weekend or two on a nice beach, and in today’s wired environment, 
bank accounts can be located anywhere.   
Some commentators have suggested that corporate residency be determined by 
the location of the corporate headquarters, where the corporation’s high executive 
officers execute their duties on a day to day basis.45  They reason that people, unlike 
corporate documents, have sincere attachments to physical locations or at least the people 
who live there.  Though executives may be happy to spend a weekend or even a week or 
two in the Cayman Islands to achieve tax advantages, they and their families will be less 
enthused about living there full time.  Others view such suggestions as  impractical.46  
Certainly changing the residency rules in this way would be a calculated risk, as there is 
more than minimal chance that some corporations would move their offices to low tax 
jurisdictions.47  Indeed, some taxpayers already seem to be doing this.  On March 11, 
2007, Halliburton announced that it was relocating its chief executive to Dubai.48  
Though company officials claimed that the reason for the move was to bring those offices 
                                                                                                                                                 
lawless.  See, e.g., Ernest Larkins, Multinationals and Their Quest for the Good Tax Haven:  Taxes Are But 
One, Albeit an Important, Consideration, 25 INT’L LAWYER 471, 472-473 (1991) (listing nontax factors); 
Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines, Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens? (December 2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=95272.. 
43 See DANIEL SANDLER, TAX TREATIES AND CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATION LEGISLATION:  PUSHING 
THE BOUNDARIES  3 (1998). 
44 See HUGH J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION:  A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS  371-373 (1997). 
45 The British taxing authorities considered, and rejected, switching to such a rule in 1980.  See DANIEL 
SANDLER, supra note 43, at 3-4.   For more recent suggestions, see, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 109TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX 
EXPENDITURES 179-80 (Comm. Print 2005); OECD TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP, PLACE OF EFFECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT CONCEPT:  SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
(Discussion Draft 2003); Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Ingenious Kerry Tax Plan, 103 TAX NOTES 477, 479 
(2004);  Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as ”Informal World Tax Organization”  Through 
National Responses to  E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 9 YALE  J.L. AND TECH. 59,   (2006) (discussing 
OECD recommendations);  Michael S. Kirsch, supra note 38, at 583-584; Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or 
Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses:  Analyzing the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the 
Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 578-579 (2003). 
46 See Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in the Digital Age, 26 
Seattle U. Law. Rev. 719, 726 (2003);  Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX 
LAW. 649, 752-753 (2006); David R. Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition:  “Foreign” and “Domestic” 
Taxpayers, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 239, 261-262 (1984). 
47See Richard Vann, supra note 32, p. 28 (detailing movement of key personnel to “regional headquarters” 
in tax favorable jurisdictions); Martin A. Sullivan, A Challenge to Conventional International Tax Wisdom,   
TAX NOTES 951, 953 (2006) (“[W]e now have the phenomenon of ‘runaway headquarters.’”).   
48 See Clifford Krauss, Halliburton Moving Its CEO From Houston to Dubai, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2007, 
at A16. 
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closer to the company’s center of business operations, and that only company offices 
were being moved and not its country of incorporation, many outside observers 
speculated that the office move was part of a multiyear, multistep process which will lead 
to its eventual reconfiguration as a foreign corporation, with significant tax 
consequences.49 And, of course, the more corporations that move their offices to any 
particular low tax jurisdiction, the more likely it is that other corporations would follow 
them there.  Should multinational corporations move to tax haven countries, high tax 
countries will be left with neither the tax base they desired nor the jobs those 
management operations supplied.  Short term gains from changing to a less 
“manipulable” rule, in short, may be more than offset by long term losses.   
Further, at an operational level, such proposals for amending the definition of 
corporate residence will lead to ambiguity.  Should one look to the location of the day to 
day activity of each particular corporate entity—including entities which may not have 
much day to day activity—to determine the residence of that particular company, or 
should one determine the residency of all the members of a related group of companies 
by reference to the residence of the parent company?  What if, as an operational matter, 
the management functions of a vertically integrated group of companies are carried out 
by a “subsidiary” in the corporate structure, which enters into a “management contract” 
with the ostensible parent company?  What seems like a sensible rule in the abstract may 
fall apart quite quickly in the real world where taxpayers have financial incentives to 
create difficult situations. 
Others have suggested that it may make more sense to have tax consequences 
depend on the residence of a corporation’s shareholders rather than the residence of the 
corporation itself. 50 To some extent, this is what the various base company tax regimes, 
including the subpart F regime found in the U.S., do.  More recent shareholder based 
proposals suggest integrating the corporate and individual income tax and marking to 
market all investments on publicly traded stock.  Each of these approaches has problems, 
along with possibilities. 
 
C.  Domesticating Foreign Corporation Income 
 It is not necessary to turn S2 into a domestic corporation (or a corporation 
domestic to another high tax jurisdiction) to subject its income to tax in a high tax 
country.  One can achieve a comparable tax effect by subjecting the domestic owners of 
S2 to tax on their share of S2’s income as S2 earns it.  Although in general, shareholders 
of corporations do not pay tax on their share of the corporation’s income unless and until 
                                                 
49 See Clifford Krauss, Halliburton Office Move Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2007, at C1.  Most 
likely, this inversion transaction will occur following the 2009 expiration of the temporary  I.R.C. § 
954(c)(6) exemption of certain related party payments from subpart F income.  Prior to 2009, this 
exemption is probably sufficient to allow other foreign Halliburton subsidiaries operating in high tax 
jurisdictions to move income out of potentially high taxed foreign entities and into Halliburton’s low taxed 
Bermudan subsidiary without running afoul of the U.S. subpart F regime.  By 2009, Halliburton’s office 
move will be “old and cold”; it can then be used as evidence of the history of foreign business and 
management necessary to exempt Halliburton from the strictures of the I.R.C. § 7874 antiinversion rules.  
See I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii).  As explained infra TAN 58-59, Halliburton will not have to worry about 
the subpart F regime once its parent corporation is a foreign corporation. 
50 But see Richard Vann, supra note 32, at 11 (outlining “practical considerations” militating against a 
shareholder based rule of corporate residence). 
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the corporation distributes a dividend to them or they sell their shares of corporate stock, 
exceptions have always been made to that general rule.  And, of course, if P or P’s 
shareholders pay a contemporaneous tax on S2’s earnings, they gain nothing from the 
interposition of S2 in the corporate structure; the taxes paid will be the same as would 
have resulted from S1 contracting directly with S2.  There are two ways in which such 
contemporaneous taxation could be effected.  One has been tried, the other merely 
suggested. 
 
1.  Base Company Regimes 
The U.S. was one of the first, if not the first, nation to enact a statutory regime  
that imputes the income of foreign subsidiaries to their domestic shareholders on a 
current basis.  Under the subpart F regime, enacted in 1962, the U.S. shareholders of 
controlled foreign corporations are forced to include in their income “constructive 
dividends” equal to their pro rata shares of those corporations’ subpart F income.51  These 
constructive dividends are included in the income of the U.S. shareholders of the foreign 
subsidiary corporations in the year the underlying income is earned by the foreign entity; 
this “deeming” thus eliminates the advantage of using a tax haven entity because the 
shareholder has to pay the U.S. Treasury the difference between the amount of foreign 
taxes paid by the foreign subsidiary and the amount of tax that would have been payable 
with respect to that income had it been earned directly by the U.S. shareholder.  Although 
some of the taxes paid with respect to such an entity’s income may go to that entity’s 
country of nominal residence, because of the immediate constructive dividend, the total 
foreign and U.S. tax paid with respect to income affected by the regime is the same in 
both nominal dollars and time value of money terms as if that income had been earned 
directly by the U.S. shareholder(s).   
This statutory regime is extremely complex in part (but only in part) because its 
reach is fairly narrow.  Only U.S. persons holding fairly significant ownership interests in 
the foreign entity are considered “U.S. shareholders” for purposes of deemed dividend 
distributions.52  Further, foreign subsidiaries are deemed to distribute as current dividends 
only specific, disfavored types of income.53  The precise contours of this disfavored 
income, or “subpart F income”, have changed over time, but the definition has always 
included a combination of passive income, other mobile income, and income generated in 
the context of certain related party transactions.  Subpart F income does not include 
income generated by active business operations such as manufacturing.   
There are a number of ways to escape the application of the subpart F tax regime.  
One option, of course, is for the subsidiary to conduct active, income generating activities 
in its country of residence.  But taxpayers do not have to go to that trouble, particularly 
now that much of the value of an enterprise stems from ownership of intellectual property 
                                                 
51 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1). 
52 See I.R.C. § 951(b) (a U.S. person must directly or indirectly own at least 10 percent of the shares of the 
controlled foreign corporation to be deemed a “United States shareholder”). 
53 See I.R.C. § 952 (defining “subpart F income”).  The scope of this definition seems to shrink with every 
tax act.  See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, P.L. 109-432, § 426(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 345 (2006), 
amending Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, P.L. 109-222, § 103(b), 120 Stat. 345 
(2006) (codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 954(c)(6)) (narrowing the definition of “foreign personal holding 
company income” to allow “redeploy[ment of] active foreign earnings with no additional tax burden”).  
H.R. REP. NO. 109-304, at 45 (2005). 
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or marketing intangibles.  Many taxpayers contract with companies, often but not always 
located in high tax countries, to carry out manufacturing or distribution functions.  These 
contractual parties earn relatively meager returns (thereby engendering relatively meager 
tax liabilities even if operating in high tax jurisdictions); most income accrues instead to 
the tax haven corporation which retains ownership of both the high value manufacturing 
and marketing intangibles and bears most of the enterprise’s business risk.  Because, as a 
technical matter, the income generated by these tax haven corporations comes from 
manufacturing,54 their income falls outside the definition of subpart F income, and hence, 
their shareholders escape the subpart F regime.55  These contractual arrangements may 
involve related or unrelated manufacturers or distributors.  One of the Tax Court cases in 
which the taxpayer prevailed involved a related contract manufacturer,56 while another 
involved an unrelated manufacturer.57  
Alternatively, the multinational entity may be structured to avoid creation of a 
U.S. shareholder to whom subpart F income could be attributed.  This is accomplished by 
placing any U.S. corporations at the bottom of the corporate chain and making the upper 
level corporations residents of low tax jurisdictions, essentially “inverting” pre-existing 
corporate structures.  Dividends, after all, stream upwards in an ownership chain; if the 
upper levels of the chain are all foreign, the U.S. has no jurisdiction to tax dividends, 
imputed or otherwise.  And the shareholders of a publicly held foreign parent company 
generally have too small a stake in the enterprise to constitute “U.S. shareholders” under 
the applicable statutory rules,58 even if all are U.S. citizens. Although the U.S. has 
enacted legislation which make it more expensive and sometimes impossible to invert 
existing corporate structures with U.S. parent companies,59 the legislation has no impact 
on corporate structures initially constructed with a foreign parent or which are taken over 
by substantial, preexisting foreign corporations.  At best then, the new anti-inversion 
statute slows the transition away from U.S. based multinationals to foreign based ones 
that lie outside the range of subpart F. 
                                                 
54 The IRS allowed the imputation of  the manufacturing activities to the tax haven corporation in Rev. Rul 
75-7, 1975-1 C.B. 244, although it  undercut the favorable tax implications of this imputation by treating 
the manufacturing company as a “branch” of the tax haven entity.  When taxpayers prevailed against IRS 
attempts to apply the “branch rule” in two Tax Court cases, the IRS revoked Rev. Rul. 75-7 in Rev. Rul. 
97-48, 1997-2 C.B. 89.  See  Barbara M. Angus and Thomas M. Zollo, Revisiting the U.S. Taxation of 
Intangible Property Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations,  84 TAXES 75, 78-79 (2006).  Although 
Treasury officials are far from sanguine about the extent of taxpayers’ claims to manufacturing imputation, 
and hence their exemption from subpart F strictures in these contract manufacturing situations, see Alison 
Bennett, Guidance on Contract Manufacturing in CFC Context Under Way, Hicks Says, 16 DAILY TAX 
REP’T I-2, I-2-I-3 (January 25, 2007), even they agree that “real CFC principals providing real value-driven 
functions” should be treated as manufacturers, an opinion shared by practitioners.  See  Barbara M. Angus 
and Thomas M. Zollo, supra, at 81-82.  
55 Pure sales income can be treated as subpart F income, but income derived from the manufacture and 
sales of goods is not.  See Treas. Reg. § 1. 954-3(a)(4)(i). 
56See Vetco, Inc. v. Cmm’r., 95 TC 348 (1990). 
57See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 348 (1990). 
58 See I.R.C. § 951(b) (“the term ‘United States shareholder’ means...a United States person...who owns...or 
is considered as owning...10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to  vote of such foreign corporation.”). 
59 See I.R.C. § 7874 and note 38 supra. 
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Other countries have enacted variants of the subpart F regime.60  Some, such as 
Germany and Canada, deem dividends paid to a broader slice of domestic shareholders or 
apply to foreign corporations in which domestic investors have substantial but not 
controlling interests.61  Some limit the application of the regime to domestic taxpayers 
having an intent to avoid taxes.62  Some deem dividends only of passive income earned 
by the foreign corporation;63 others apply to all the income earned by related entities in 
“black listed” jurisdictions, or by companies that are not resident in a “white listed” 
jurisdiction.64  Most of the avoidance possibilities depend on the precise configuration of 
the underlying statutory regimes, but careful structuring of the overall entity to include a 
foreign parent always works to escape the strictures of these regimes. 65 Now that it is 
relatively easy for the shares of companies based in tax haven countries to be sold in 
established securities markets,66 there is little reason for corporations to be residents of 
high tax countries. 
 
 2.  Integration-based proposals 
The mutability of corporate residence and structure has led some to suggest that it 
would make sense to focus taxation on individual shareholders who are far less mobile 
than artificial entities like corporations.  Such proposals inevitably involve reducing the 
current two-level corporate tax to one, since it seems impolitic to attempt to collect two 
levels of tax directly from individual taxpayers.  The suggestion that has been proposed 
most often is simply to move to mark to market taxation of publicly traded stock.67  The 
                                                 
60 See OECD, CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION  21 (1996) (14 OECD countries and one non-
OECD country have CFC legislation). 
61 See DANIEL SANDLER, supra note 43, at 25 (Germany); id. at 26. 
62 See OECD, supra note 60, at 28 (Italy). 
63See id. at 46 (Denmark and Norway).   
64See id. at 23 (Japan, with disfavored jurisdictions determined by statutory tax rate); id. at 24 (United 
Kingdom); id. at 25 (New Zealand); id. at 26 (Sweden) 
65 See id. at 32-33 (“A key feature of all CFC regimes is that the legislation only applies to foreign entities 
over which domestic taxpayers have substantial influence....generally of a majority of the shares of the 
corporation.”).  The United States’ Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) regime, contained in 
I.R.C. §§ 1291 through 1298, is an exception to this rule but it applies only to passive investment income 
earned by U.S. shareholders of foreign investment companies.  Though the PFIC rules place no floor on 
either the individual or aggregate U.S. ownership, removing the economic benefits of deferral from minor 
U.S. shareholders of largely foreign owned corporations, the regime only comes into play when 75 percent 
or more of the foreign corporation’s gross income consists of “passive income” or at least 50 percent of its 
assets generate such passive income.  See I.R.C. § 1297(a).  
66 One can argue that the worst things to happen to corporate income taxation was the opening of the 
developed countries’ securities markets to foreign issuers.  It certainly gave tax haven based companies 
easier and cheaper access to developed country capital.  But foreign companies had long come up with 
mechanisms to access those markets; moreover, it is possible that failing to open those markets to foreign 
issuers would simply have led over time to the transfer of those markets (and the associated jobs) to more 
hospitable jurisdictions.  Indeed, some have already begun sounding the alarm over the decline of the 
primacy of U.S. securities markets.  See Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Set to Be No. 1 in 2006 Offerings, 
Surpassing London and New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at C-4;  Sewell Chan, Mayor Takes His 
Message to London, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at C-2; Heather Timmons, New York Isn’t the World’s 
Undisputed Financial Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at C-1.  
67 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, A Market Value Based Corporate Income Tax, 68 TAX NOTES 1347, 1348 
(1995); David Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L. J. 
623 (1967).  These pieces are part of a larger discussion on the merits of moving from a realization based 
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value of stock should, after all, reflect the corporation’s total income, including the 
income of any tax haven subsidiaries.  Like all integration proposals, this one raises the 
issue of what to do about shareholdings of tax exempt entities and, more importantly for 
purposes of this paper, foreign taxpayers.   
Tax exempt entities are a problem because present law’s double tax system allows 
for the collection of a single level of tax on corporate income attributable to shares owned 
by exempt entities; such entities thus avoid only the second layer of tax on their share of 
corporate earnings.  Elimination of the corporate level tax, in favor of mark to market 
taxation of increases in share value, would force the U.S. to choose between an all or 
nothing taxation regime.  The first alternative would raise taxes on tax exempt entities, 
while the second would decrease their tax burden and, accordingly, government revenues. 
Of course, even now the portfolio effect minimizes the burden of taxes falling on 
exempt entities.  That is, such tax exempt corporations often invest in bonds rather than 
corporate stock to maximize their tax advantage.  Elimination of the tax on corporate 
income may change  little more than their investment strategies, which is at least 
arguably a good thing.  
The conundrum posed by foreign taxpayers is more difficult.  In theory, foreign 
owners of publicly traded stock should not be taxable on their gains.  The tax, after all, is 
a residence based one; passive foreign investors do not become residents or a nation 
simply by investing in the shares of corporations resident there or trading on its stock 
exchanges.  From a distributional standpoint, however, that means that substantial 
amounts of income derived from source country business operations would never be 
taxed by the source country.  The cost of providing the services utilized by those 
businesses would thus have to be borne entirely by source country residents.  In a 
Coasian world, perhaps that does not matter; the additional taxes should be recompensed 
by higher salaries and source-country employment—which the source country can tax.  
The appearance may be worse than the economic reality.  Or perhaps not; it depends on 
how well Coasian bargaining works in the real world.  Such a result will certainly be 
politically unpopular.   
Perhaps some of that unpopularity could be diffused by recognition that at least 
some of the taxes that the source country loses in its status as a source country would be 
offset by the additional taxes gained by taxing its residents on their foreign source gains, 
including gains attributable to increases in the value of shares of foreign companies. 
But the existence (and amount) of such offsets depends on two assumptions.  One is that 
the country’s residents earn approximately as much from foreign sources as foreign 
owners derive domestically.68  The other is that the country’s residents will honestly 
report those foreign share earnings to home country tax authorities.  Both of these 
assumptions are questionable.  The removal of the withholding tax on portfolio interest 
                                                                                                                                                 
regime to an accrual or mark to market regime.  For examples of the larger context, see, e.g., David J. 
Shakow, Taxation Without Realization:  A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 34 U. PENN. L. REV. 1111 
(1986); Victor Thuronyi, The Taxation of Corporate Income—A Proposal for Reform, 2 AM. J. OF TAX 
POL’Y 109 (1983).   
68 The implicit revenue exchanges would resemble those effectuated by many bilateral tax treaties, whereby 
countries agree to give up the right to impose source taxes on residents of their treaty partner.  In theory, 
the absence of source taxation leads to higher residence tax collection. The actuality, however, in treaty 
situations is quite different, see Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate 
Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1766-1767 (1995).     
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income provided a window into the sorts of compliance problems that are likely to arise.  
That experience shows that many  investors would evade their residence tax obligations 
by investing in shares of foreign companies and simply failing to report those holdings to 
the tax authorities of their residence countries.69  Absent much more elaborate exchange 
of information arrangements than currently exist,70 the chances of any individual taxpayer 
being caught are slim.  Nor do investors with strong home country biases have to be left 
behind (though taxpayers with strong ethics would be).  They may continue to invest in 
domestic stocks through a foreign intermediary which, particularly if not publicly traded, 
would escape notice.  The globalization of capital markets continues to make cross-
border investing ever easier and cheaper. 
Of course, the availability of abnormally high after tax returns made possible by 
the absence of source or residence taxation may attract more foreign investors in 
domestic stock.  But this may be a mixed blessing, if blessing at all.  The additional 
investment by foreigners may simply substitute for those domestic investors who decide 
to seek their own tax favored return by investing in (similarly tax favored) foreign stock. 
The overall amount of investment may change little if at all.  Though such avoidance 
techniques may not be legal (at least under the tax rules of the taxpayer’s country of 
residence), again, the odds of any taxpayer being caught are not high. 
Yet, taxing foreigners on their stock market gains has always been problematic 
because of the limited connection between such shareholders and the country seeking to 
do the taxing.  There is relatively little that source countries can do to enforce such taxes.  
Often, foreigners do not have cash or assets other than the affected stock located in the 
tax seeking country.  Unlike dividends, there is no cash payment to shareholders out of 
which the issuing corporation can be forced to withhold and pay the appropriate tax to 
governmental authorities; this is even more of a problem when dealing with mark to 
market gains than with actual stock sales.  Conceivably, the tax could be enforced as a 
lien against the affected stock, which then could not be transferred absent payment to the 
government.71  This would place a substantial, and perhaps impossible, burden on 
financial intermediaries such as brokers.  Indeed, at least partly as a result of these 
administrative problems, current U.S. tax law does not impose a tax on most foreigners’ 
stock market gains,72 and tax treaties generally provide equivalent or better protection 
against source country taxation for stock market gains.73 
  These enforcement problems are hardly unique to a mark to market tax system; 
indeed, most believe that underreporting of capital gains income under current tax 
regimes is quite extensive.  However, currently the tax being avoided (or evaded) is just 
                                                 
69 See Joe Kirwin, EU Hopes to Extend Savings Tax Agreement To Accounts in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Macao, 199 DAILY TAX REP’T G-4 (Oct. 16, 2006) (EU member states unhappy “because they have not 
recovered the tax revenue they expected with the approval of the EU savings tax directive...[because] 
millions of its citizens have money hidden in Luxembourg”). 
70 As the U.S. has learned, information returns are virtually useless unless they can be machine read and 
include the taxpayer’s home country TIN.   
71 Taxpayers might then try to avoid such rules by holding their shares in entities incorporated in tax haven 
jurisdictions, and then trading the shares of the intermediating entities. 
72 See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(2) (nontaxation of capital gains generated by nonresident aliens present in the US 
for less than 183 days of the current tax year); 881(a) (imposing withholding tax on limited categories of 
US capital gains). 
73 See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, Art. 13 (limiting source 
country taxation of gains). 
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one of two levels of tax.  Realized corporate profits are supposedly being taxed at the 
corporate level.  No such corporate tax would be payable under an integrated mark to 
market regime. 
The limited success of traditional methods of protecting the corporate tax base in 
a globally integrated economy has led to the recent interest in essentially scrapping the 
current system for taxing international income, based as it is on arm’s length 
methodology and respect for the individuality of separate legal entities, and replacing it 
with a method which forces the combination of related entities for tax computation 
purposes and then allocates the combined income between countries according to a 
formula based on “real economic factors.”  It is hoped that such a taxing regime will 
prevent multinational corporations from being able to isolate their earnings in tax haven 
entities, and force them to pay taxes commensurate to on the services and other benefits 
that they enjoy in high tax countries.  Those hopes may well be dashed, however, as 
many of the avoidance techniques honed under current law will prove to be equally 
effective at undermining the effectiveness of  such a formulary taxation. 
 
III.  Formulary Taxation 
 Proponents of formulary taxation have a model from which to work:  the states of 
the United States use a formulary method to tax the income derived by multistate 
businesses.  Or, more accurately, the states of the United States use a variety of formulary 
methods to tax the income derived by multistate businesses, some of which incorporate 
unitary aspects.  Though the variation in methods is far from ideal when it comes to fairly 
and fully taxing the income of multistate enterprises, the contrast in the relative success 
of various approaches sheds light on the importance of some design issues and the 
intractability of others. 
  
 A.  History of the Formulary Method in the U.S. 
 The states first used formulary apportionment methods in the late1800s to 
determine the property tax obligations of transcontinental railroad companies.74  The first 
state to adopt a corporate income tax, Wisconsin, decided to use a similar method when 
determining its share of the base for its new tax.  It explicitly rejected the separate 
accounting approach as too impractical given the fact that few corporations kept state-by-
state calculations of income.75  It determined its share of corporate income by relying on 
a formula based on “business transacted” and “property located” within and without the 
state.76  Other states began enacting their own corporate income taxes following the 
introduction of the federal corporate income tax in 1913.77  Although the “usual practice” 
under “early state income taxes” was to allow taxpayers to use separate accounting if 
their accounting records made possible “reasonably accurate” state income 
                                                 
74 Joann M. Weiner, Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula 
Apportionment at the International Level, OTA Paper 83 (1999), at 6.  
75 Id. 
76Law of July 13, 1911, ch. 658, 1911 Wis. Laws 984 (cited in 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN,  STATE TAXATION ¶8.02[3], at 8-16 fn.43 (3rd ed. 2002)).  
77 See Joanne Martens Weiner, Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union:  
Insights From the United States and Canada, Working Paper No. 8, at 11 (March 2005), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/taxtion/taxation.htm.. 
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determinations,78  this practice was beginning to disappear by the late 1930s.  Most state 
statutes now require formulary apportionment.79  The switch to the formulary approach 
was supported by taxpayers as well as state legislators because it minimized taxpayers’ 
compliance costs.80   
However, concerns about lack of uniformity surfaced immediately because these 
tax systems were creatures of state rather than federal law.  Taxpayers worried at least as 
much about the costs of reconfiguring their income statements and defining and 
measuring the apportionment factors to meet different state standards as they did about 
the possibility of overtaxation.  In response to these concerns, a committee of the 
National Tax Association81 designed a model multistate business income tax in 1922,82 
and in 1933 the organization recommended that the states adopt the Massachusetts 
apportionment formula.83  This formula equally weighted property, payroll and sales 
factors.84  In 1957, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws85 
drafted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDIPTA), which was 
intended to serve as the model for state corporate income tax laws.86  Unlike previous 
uniformity efforts, UDIPTA provided rules for measuring the factors used in the 
recommended formula and special rules for particularly problematic categories of 
income.  Of the 44 states with broad based corporate income taxes, 21 have adopted 
UDIPTA and most of the others have similar statutory schemes.87  In 1967, the states 
created the Multistate Tax Compact and the Multistate Tax Commission to encourage 
states to adopt uniform state tax laws and regulations, as well as to provide a vehicle for 
suggesting legislative and regulatory changes.88  The Commission also provides a forum 
for conducting joint audits and resolving disputes.  Forty-four of the fifty states 
participate in the Multistate Tax Commission although only 20 are members of the 
Multistate Tax Compact.89 
                                                 
781 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN,  supra  note 76,  ¶ 8.03, at 8-39. 
79See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN,  supra,  ¶ 8.03, at 8- 40.; Joann M. Weiner, 
supra note 74 , at  7. 
80 Joann M. Weiner, supra note 74 , at  7 (“A survey taken by the National Tax Association in 1938 
revealed that most states and businesses preferred formula apportionment to separate accounting.”). 
81 The National Tax Association was comprised of state tax officials.  It merged with the Tax Institute of 
America in 1973 and the combined organization  is known as the NTA-TIA.  See David M. Hudson & 
Daniel C. Turner, International and Interstate Approaches to Taxing Business Income, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 562, 594  n.195 (1984). 
82 See  Joann M. Weiner, supra note 74, at 9. 
83 See id. at 10. 
84 See id.  
85 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is a non-profit, unincorporated 
association which has been drafting uniform laws for adoption by state legislatures since 1882.  The 
commissioners are lawyers—sometimes state legislators, sometimes judges, academics or private 
practitioners—who have been appointed to serve as state representatives to the Conference.  It is supported 
by appropriations from the participating state governments. See 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (as of Feb. 8, 2007). 
86 See Joann M. Weiner, supra note 74, at 10. 
87 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 596 (8th ed. 2005).  
88 Joann M. Weiner, supra note 74, at  11. 
89 See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 605 (describing Multistate 
Tax Compact and Multistate Tax Commission). 
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B.  Description of Formulary Taxation Methods 
The construction of a tax system always involves making choices among 
plausible alternative rules.  This is no less true in the design of formulary tax systems 
than any other tax system.  The prevalence of such choices means that there are almost as 
many versions of  formulary taxation systems as there are jurisdictions that have adopted 
such methods; it is impossible to describe all of them.  Yet all the systems have some 
common features.  In particular, each starts from three building blocks:  apportionable 
income, the apportionment formula, and the definitions of the factors utilized in the 
apportionment formula.  Each of these building blocks, and their available variations,  is 
explored in greater detail below. 
 
 1.  Apportionable Income, or the Tax Base 
The first building block of any formulary tax system is the choice of the tax base.  
This choice really entails three sub-choices.  The first sub-choice is how broadly to cast 
the income net at an entity level, that is, the extent to which the income of related 
corporations should be considered when divining the income of a particular corporate 
taxpayer.  The second sub-choice is whether all the income of the taxpayer (however 
defined) ought to be apportioned by formula, or whether parts of it ought to be 
specifically allocated on some other basis.  The third sub-choice goes to the substance of 
the rules used to define taxable income, that is, the rules used to determining the amount 
and items of income included in any given year and the identity and amount of 
deductions allowed against that income. . 
The first question is whether the apportionment formula should be applied solely 
against the income reported as accruing to the legal entity over which jurisdiction can be 
claimed, or if the income of that entity should be more broadly defined. As the example 
in the first part of the article shows, if related entities are engaged in a single, vertically 
integrated business enterprise, taxpayers may attempt to minimize taxes by strategically 
setting intercorporate transfer prices, limiting the income deemed earned by an entity 
resident in or taxable by a high tax jurisdiction.  This strategy can be upset by tax 
authorities’ policing of the economic bona fides of the prices used in particular 
transactions.  However, these attacks are always piecemeal in nature.  Another, much 
more categorical approach is to force consolidation of the related companies for tax 
purposes, either in whole or in part.  Essentially, the question is whether the boundaries 
of legal entities should be respected for tax purposes, or whether “a multiple-entity 
affiliated corporate group that operate[s] as a single economic enterprise” should be 
combined into a single unit for tax purposes.90  Conceptually, the point of such forced 
combinations or “unitary taxation” need not be to tax the income of related corporations 
over which the state would ordinarily have no jurisdiction; it can be instead simply to 
accurately calculate and tax the income generated by the company over which the state 
does have jurisdiction.  However, some blurring of jurisdictional lines becomes inevitable 
when an entity’s whose income ordinarily would not be taxable in a jurisdiction finds 
some of its factors attributed to that jurisdiction under the unitary calculation.  For 
example, suppose Corporation A has no office or trade or business in Jurisdiction Y, but 
$60 of its $100 in total widget sales come from Y.  A’s sister corporation, Corporation B, 
                                                 
90 Joann M. Weiner, supra note 74, at  8. 
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sells $100 in widgets to Y consumers through its sales office located in Y.  Under 
separate entity accounting, Y would not tax A’s Y-sourced sales income.  But under a 
formulary unitary method, not only would the income of A and B be pooled for tax 
purposes, so too would be their factors—and $160 of out of the $200 total sales factor 
would be allocable to Y.  Whether this leaves the taxpayer better or worse off (in terms of 
Y tax liablity) depends of course on whether 160/200ths of the combined income of A 
and B is more or less than 100 percent of B’s income.   
Although all states that tax corporate income use formula apportionment, only 
about one third use some version of “unitary” taxation to draw in the income of related 
out of state corporations; the remainder look solely to the income and factors generated 
by the individual corporations over which they have jurisdiction.91 The problem with 
conjoining separate entity accounting and formulary taxation is obvious.  Taxpayers learn 
to stuff income (and sometimes factors) into entities lacking jurisdictional ties to high tax 
states.  States’ failure to adopt unitary accounting is one reason that the effective state 
corporate income tax rate “was only a third of the 6.8 percent average statutory state 
corporate income tax rate.”92  
For constitutional reasons, the states of the United States can only consider the 
income and factors of related corporations that are engaged in a “unitary business” with 
the taxpayer.93  There is no easily applied definition of a unitary business; whether one 
exists or not is determined by all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.  
Common control is a necessary but not sufficient criteria for businesses to be considered 
“unitary.”  Courts generally look for similarities in business operations or evidence of 
vertical integration or functional integration which could give rise to economies of scale.  
Moreover, states’ ending point for application of the unitary method is federal 
consolidated income; they do not extend the unitary concept to foreign corporations 
lacking significant business presence in the U.S., even if those corporations are 
functionally integrated with a related corporation’s U.S. business operations.  The 
“water’s edge” restriction on the reach of unitary taxation is a result of a combination of 
economic and political pressures placed on those states which flirted with worldwide 
combination measures.94 
Further, again for constitutional reasons, the states use their formulas to apportion 
only the income derived from multistate business activities.  Certain types of business 
income, such as rent received with respect to real property, may be directly allocated to 
the state in which such property is located.95  Other types of income, particularly that 
determined to be “nonbusiness income,”96 may be allocated to the taxpayers’ state of 
                                                 
91 See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis:  Lessons for Congress on Closing Loopholes, 110 TAX 
NOTES 1024, 1025 (2006). 
92 Robert S. McIntrye and T.D. Coo Nguyen, State Corporate Income Taxes 2001-2003 (2005), at 3, 
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/corp0205an.pdf..  
93 Indeed, they can only take into consideration out-of-state income of the same corporation that is part of 
the business carried out within the taxing state.  See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN  AND WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN,  supra note 75,  ¶ 8.07[1], at 8-58. 
94 For a trenchant critique of those pressures, see Stanley I. Langbein, supra note 29, at 671-672.  
95 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 617. 
96  “Nonbusiness income” is income which does not arise from transactions or activity undertaken in the 
regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business or which is incidental to that business.  See id. at 617-618. 
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residence or commercial domicile.97  When the characterization of a particular income 
item is questionable, the MTC’s regulations mandate its treatment as “business 
income.”98  The difficulty of distinguishing between business and nonbusiness income 
has led some states to eliminate the distinction between business and nonbusiness 
income, but it remains questionable whether states have the constitutional authority to 
apportion all income.99 
The broader the income net, however, the more significant the third issue, the 
issue of how to define the tax base, becomes. As anyone who has taken a tax course 
knows, the design of any tax system involves numerous choices; it is hardly surprising 
that different designers have not made the same choices in all or even many cases.   
Taxing authorities require taxpayers to keep at least one set of books and records 
detailing their income calculated in accordance with their particular rules.  It can be quite 
difficult for a taxpayer to translate books and records constructed with the demands of 
one tax authority in mind into the form required by another tax authority with a different 
set of computational rules.  Nor is it easy or costless for taxpayers to construct a separate 
set of books and records for each taxing authority. But, of course, the broader the reach of 
unitary systems, the more such translations or sets of books must be maintained by 
affected taxpayers and their affiliates, since all their income, and all their factors, may 
have to be reported to each of the jurisdictions involved in the unitary business enterprise 
in accordance with that jurisdiction’s particularized rules.  Alternatively, a jurisdiction 
might allow taxpayers to blend income computed under different statutory standards but 
this would have its own problems. 
One reason that unitary systems have been a viable option for states of the United 
States is that virtually all the states piggyback to a considerable extent on the federal 
government’s definition of corporate taxable income.100  Thus, a minimum of translation 
or adjustment is required to conform the income statements of a Delaware company to 
the requirements of, say, Massachusetts.  This is not to say that some adjustments, and 
sometimes considerable adjustments, have to be made to conform the tax bases, but they 
are relatively minor compared to the differences one finds between the tax codes of 
various nations. 
 
 2.  The Apportionment Formula 
Once the tax base has been determined, that base must be apportioned among the 
various jurisdictions from which the taxpayer has derived income.  This apportionment is 
accomplished by application of a formula against the tax base.  The formula determines 
the percentage of a taxpayer’s tax factors located within in each such jurisdiction; each 
jurisdiction is then apportioned that percentage of the taxpayer’s net income as its tax 
base. Choosing the appropriate economic factors and deciding how much weight to 
accord the chosen factors in the formula are thus the critical design issues.  The 
                                                 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 618.  
99 See id. at 627; Michael J. McIntyre, Paull Mines and Richard D. Pomp, Designing a Combined Reporting 
Regime for a State Corporate Income Tax: A Case Study of Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REV. 699, 722 (2001) 
(contending elimination of distinction unconstitutional). 
100 The Canadian system of provincial taxes carries this uniformity to the extreme.  The provinces follow 
the federal government’s rules completely, in return for the federal government’s carrying out of the 
collection and auditing function.  See Joann Martens-Weiner, supra note 6, at 68. 
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Massachusetts formula originally recommended by the National Tax Association called 
for equal weighting of three factors:  payroll, sales and business property. Even before the 
economic literature began suggesting that “to the extent tax rates vary across 
jurisdictions, formula-apportioned corporate income taxes are similar in their incidence to 
a set of implicit excise taxes on the apportionment factors,”101 though, some U.S. states 
had begun moving towards formulas placing more weight on the sales factor.102  This 
trend has accelerated as state legislatures have become convinced that sales are the least 
manipulable of the factors.  Currently, “almost three-fourth of the states that have 
corporate income taxes place at least half the weight on sales, and eight base 
apportionment solely on sales.”103   Most of the remainder are natural resource rich states 
which do not have to worry about business relocations.104   
This description illustrates one salient fact about formulary apportionment that is 
often overlooked:  it does not eliminate tax competition.  Taxpayers operating under 
formulary apportionment regimes can reduce their tax liability by relocating tax factors 
from high tax to low tax jurisdictions.  The question then becomes whether such 
relocation is possible.  One consideration in choosing factors must be the ease (or not) of 
such relocations, both real and virtual. 
 
3.  The Apportionment Factors 
 A variety of factors have been utilized over the years.  An initial criteria, of 
course, is that the factor be seen as causally related to the production of income; only that 
relationship makes its use politically, constitutionally (in the U.S.), and economically 
acceptable.  In the early days of formulary apportionment, sixteen states used formulas 
taking multiple factors into account, including property, payroll, sales, manufacturing 
costs, purchases, expenditures for labor, accounts receivable, net cost of sales, capital 
assets, and stock of other companies.105  Over time the trend has been towards the use of 
a smaller number of factors, typically some combination of property, payroll, and 
sales.106  This combination formula appears to split income, and thus tax revenue, 
between the jurisdictions in which the taxpayers engage in their business activities and 




Payroll is defined as the total amount paid for compensation of employees, 
including wages, salaries, commissions and in-kind payments such as rent and housing.  
                                                 
101See Charles E. McClure, Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax:  Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (Henry Aaron and M. Boskin eds. 1980).  
102 Iowa’s single-factor sales formula was “long-standing” by the time the Supreme Court upheld its 
constitutionality in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276 (1978).  Nor was Iowa alone in 
its disproportionate weighting of the sales factor; five other states had over-weighted the state factor by the 
year Moorman was decided.  Kirk J. Stark, The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income 
Taxation, 2001 I.B.F.D. 523, 528 (2001).  
103 Charles E. McClure Jr. and Walter Hellerstein, Does Sales-Only Apportionment Violate International 
Trade Rules?,  96 TAX NOTES 1513, 1514 (2002) 
104 See Bharat N. Anand and Richard Sansing, The Weighting Game:  Formula Apportionment as an 
Instrument of Public Policy, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 183, 193 (2000). 
105 See Joann M. Weiner, supra note 74, at 13. 
106 Id. at 13-14. 
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Payments to independent contractors and other non-employee service providers are not 
taken  into account in this factor. 
 
b. Property 
      UDITPA measures the property factor by the average value of the taxpayer’s real and 
tangible personal property, whether rented or owned.  Rental property is valued at eight 
times its net annual rent, while owned property is valued at original cost plus the cost of 
additions and improvements.  Depreciation is not allowed.   
 
 c.  Sales 
The sales factor includes all business income, whether from sales of goods, sales 
of services, rentals, royalties, or other unspecified business income.  It is measured by 
gross receipts net of returns, allowances, and discounts.  Sales of tangible property are 
treated as occurring in the state to which the goods are delivered or shipped.  Income 
derived from other sorts of income producing transactions are assigned to the state in 
which the income-producing activity is performed, as demonstrated by the location of the 
costs of performing the activity.  If an income-producing activity is performed in several 
states, UDITPA assigns the sales to the state in which the greatest costs of performance 
were incurred. 
The operation of these state systems of formulary apportionment provides a case 
study of the perils that await those trying to impose a similar method of apportionment  
for income derived across national boundaries.  Though some of the problems associated 
with the current, separate accounting based methods of allocating taxing jurisdiction are 
eliminated, some problems remain and new ones are created.  How serious these 
problems are depends to a large extent on taxpayers’ ability and willingness to forego 
some vertical integration of their activities.  
  
C. Operational Issues 
Whether a formulary method will work to solve—or even ameliorate—the current 
problems in the taxation of international transactions depends on two factors.  The first is 
whether taxpayers can manipulate the factors contained in the formula to assign 
disproportionate amounts of income to low tax jurisdictions or jurisdictions which lack 
taxing power over them.  The second is whether the base of the tax can be extended far 
enough, and completely enough, to keep taxpayers from placing undue amounts of their 
income beyond the reach of the formulary apportionment scheme.  These two issues are 
related, both practically and thematically.  At base, the question is whether formulary 
taxation will be significantly more effective than current, arm’s length methods at 
stemming tax avoidance techniques. As the discussion below explains, neither the factors 
nor the tax base issues can be completely resolved; formulary taxation will never be a 
panacea.  And unfortunately, many of the techniques taxpayers have developed to avoid 
tax under the current system can continue to be used to reduce taxation effected under a 
formulary method.  The success (or lack thereof) of a formulary method in taxing 
international income will depend to a very large extent on patterns of trade and 
consumption, as well as the willingness of taxpayers to substitute contractual 
arrangements with unrelated parties for vertical integration through ownership.  The U.S. 
experience with the subpart F regime provides grounds for pessimism on both fronts. 
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 1.  Factor Manipulation 
Formulary taxation works only if and to the extent the factors used in the formula 
actually allocate income on an economically realistic basis.  If they do not, if the factors 
can result in the allocation of income to jurisdictions in which taxpayers engage in  
relatively little business activity or derive little income, taxpayers will surely continue to 
locate income in low or no tax jurisdictions.  Thus the question is, to what extent are the 
factors that have been used in formulary methods “real economic factors”—and to the 
extent they are not, can they be made “more economic”?  These questions must be 
addressed on a factor by factor basis. 
 
  a.  The Payroll Factor 
In the U.S., the payroll factor is measured by the amounts reported as 
compensation to each state for state unemployment insurance purposes.  As these  
amounts are determined under the Model Unemployment Compensation Act, the same 
metric is used by all states, and there is no reason to worry about state’s use of 
inconsistent measures to distort the amounts allocated to them.107  Different countries, of 
course, have different definitions of compensation.  In particular, they treat non-cash 
fringe benefits, which may amount to a substantial portion of salary, differently.  These 
differences, if not adjusted, may lead to the systematic underrepresentation of some 
countries in the payroll factor. 
More importantly, though, one has to worry about the failure to include payments 
to independent contractors and other non-employees  in the payroll amount.  In an era 
where “outsourcing” and “leasing” of employees is common, employers interested in 
reducing their tax burdens may selectively engage in such practices in high tax 
jurisdictions. This is far from a hypothetical worry.  Currently, one technique for 
avoiding the reach of subpart F involves hiring a third party (call it Corp X)  to perform 
manufacturing services in a country A using the taxpayer’s (call it Corp Y’s) raw 
materials and intellectual property, including manufacturing know-how.  Although the 
Corp X’s income would be taxable in A, the country in which it conducted its activities, 
even if Corp Y were theoretically taxable in A, none of Corp Y’s  income would be 
apportioned to A under the payroll apportionment factor.  Corp Y, after all, has no 
employees in A.  It may derive a great deal of income from the manufacturing activity, 
however, by virtue of playing the role of financier, insurer of business risks, and, of 
course, provider of manufacturing know how and the like.  But none of this income 
would be apportioned to A under the payroll factor.108At least in the US, taxpayers have 
succeeded in finding “contract manufacturers” as these Corp X’s are called, willing to 
play their roles for very small mark-ups over cost, leaving the Corp Y’s with the lion’s 
share of the resulting profits.  Meanwhile, Corp Y’s do not have to have a large staff to 
carry out their lucrative tasks, and can often locate that staff in a small tax haven country. 
                                                 
107 See1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 75, ¶ 9.17, at 9-170-171. 
108 Nor would it be apportioned to A under property or sales factors, since Corp Y neither owns nor leases 
property in A (it is instead paying Corp X for the provision of a service) and derives no income from 
selling goods in A.  Moreover, as described in more detail infra  TAN 14-20, Corp Y probably lacks 
sufficient contacts with A for A to exercise taxing jurisdiction over any income apportioned to it. 
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Interestingly, the definition of the property factor attempts to forestall analogous 
misbehavior by including a multiple of rental payments as the value of “leased” 
property.109  This may be much harder to do in the payroll context, however, if only 
because it is harder for all involved to be aware of, or keep track of, the instances and 
locations of all independent contractors.110  It would be hard to draft a rule that swept into 
the net amounts paid for “leased employees” and not legal fees paid to an outside law 
firm.111  Then again, perhaps no distinction should be made since a company has the 
option of maintaining an in-house legal department; its decision not to do so, or to 
maintain a smaller one, might be affected by tax considerations.   
 
  b.  Property 
There are two measurement issues that arise in connection with the property 
factor.  One is the use of original cost, rather than depreciated cost or fair market value, 
as the basis of measurement.  The other is the exclusion of intangible property. 
The reason for using original cost is straightforward:  it is easy and promotes 
uniformity across jurisdictions.  It avoids the necessity of reconciling different 
depreciation systems across jurisdictions.  And it avoids strategic misbehavior by both 
taxpayers and jurisdictions.  The problem with using this figure is also straightforward:  
the original cost of an asset may bear little or no relationship to its current fair market 
value, which is surely the most economically relevant figure.   
The absence of any allowance for depreciation results in the systematic 
overvaluation of older assets, thus decreasing the tax apportionable to jurisdictions in 
which new investments have been made.  It is unclear how significant a problem this is, 
however.  It is undoubtedly offset to some extent by a countervailing measurement 
failure, namely, the failure to adjust asset values for inflation.  To the extent depreciation 
occurs in tandem with inflation, the original value (cost) of an asset may approximate its 
current fair market values.  Whether this happy confluence of values occurs very often is 
unclear; it would require a committed optimist to believe that it is a regular occurrence.  
And, of course, inflation does not correct for changes in relative values. 
Though the use of original value thus resembles nothing so much as the 
proverbial “looking under the streetlight because it is too dark to look elsewhere,” it 
probably is too dark to look elsewhere.  Not only would the determination of the fair 
market value of assets be a costly process, it may not lead to more accurate results 
because of taxpayer (or jurisdictional) misbehavior.  Much business property does not 
                                                 
109 See Joann Martens Weiner, supra note 77, at  21.  
110It is unlikely, however, that even the expanded definition of rental payments includes the imputed rent 
portion of a payment for contract manufacturing services.  To the extent it does not, taxpayers have a way 
to defeat the statutory attempt to include all rental property in the factor computation.  This raises another 
issue:  if the definition of  payroll were expanded to include the cost of all subcontracted work, some 
portion of the cost would in fact be attributable to other factors such as property.  Would accuracy be 
advanced by inclusion in the wrong factor instead of no factor at all?  Of course, when a third party 
provides either buildings or employees,  the third party should be earning (and paying tax) on the normal 
return for their use.  At issue then is the location of the supernormal returns or rents derived from some 
combination of risk, business acumen, and intellectual property.  When related parties are involved at both 
ends of the contract, even the normal return may be at issue.  
111 Canada includes “fees paid to another person for services that would normally be performed by 
employees of the corporation” in the payroll factor. Id.  It would be interesting to know how successful its 
tax authorities are at making that distinction. 
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trade on the open market on a regular basis.  Just as is currently true of transfer prices, 
one would expect taxpayers to report uncertain valuations on the basis that would most 
benefit them. 
Despite the inclusion of leased property in the property formula, outsourcing is a 
problem for this factor as well.  Recall that under the contract manufacturing scenario 
described above, the independent contractor, Corp X, provided manufacturing facilities 
as well as manufacturing services.  Yet, because the transaction would be structured as a 
service contract, the value of those facilities would not be included in the property 
formula.  Perhaps that should not matter, since Corp X after all is taxed in A on the 
income it generates from its use of those facilities.  As an independent third party, Corp X 
ought to be extracting the fair market value of that use from Corp Y through contract.  
Corp Y’s profit, in short, may not be derived from the use of the physical manufacturing 
property per se, but from other economic factors.  Those factors are the product designs, 
manufacturing know how, branding and other forms of intellectual property used in the 
manufacture and eventual sale of the goods manufactured by Corp X. 
The more serious distortion in the property formula comes from the fact that   
intangibles such as those listed above are generally excluded from the definition of 
property, even though (for accounting purposes) such intangibles account for 
approximately 70 percent of the value of the top 150 U.S. companies.112  Again, this 
exclusion too may not be as problematic as it first appears.  First, intangible property is 
even harder to value than most physical assets.  Thus including it in the apportionment 
formula might simply recreate the transfer pricing disputes that afflict separate 
accounting taxing systems in a slightly different guise.  Moreover, even if intangible 
property could be valued, it is quite difficult to assign it to a particular location precisely 
because of its intangible nature.  This makes its inclusion in the property factor an 
invitation for taxpayer manipulation.  Indeed, for many (but not all) types of intangible 
income, particularly intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights and marketing 
intangibles, one can make the case that the sales factor serves as a better proxy for 
income assignment purposes than the “location” of such property.113  After all, many of 
these intangibles114 generate value (whether through restraint of competition or through 
development of market demand) in the location where the product is consumed.  If one is 
worried about distortions, the better move might be to increase the weight accorded to the 
sales factor to take into account that it is also serving at least part of the role of the 
property factor.  Of course, that assumes that the sales factor looks to where the product 
or service is consumed.  As the next paragraph makes clear, that is not always the case. 
 
  c.  Sales and Gross Receipts 
The sales factor sweeps in virtually all business receipts.  Income from the sale of 
tangible property is allocated to the state in which is shipped or delivered, unless the 
taxpayer is not taxable in the state, in which case it is allocated to the state from which it 
                                                 
112Sebastian Mallaby, Powerful brand carries worth far beyond a familiar name, THE TIMES UNION, 
August 13, 2006, b-8. 
113 This is certainly true if the location of such assets would otherwise be determined by the residence of its 
owner. 
114 Unfortunately, this is not uniformly true.  Process patents and other technological know-how relating to 
processes of production, would seem to generate value at least as much in the country where such 
production takes place as elsewhere. 
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is shipped.115  Services income is allocated to the state in which the services are 
performed; if they are performed in several states, the income is assigned to the state 
where the greatest proportion of the income producing activity was performed.   
The adoption of a delivery rule, rather than the “title passage” rule common to 
arm’s length taxation systems,116 certainly is a move in the direction of economic 
reality.117  It is much more likely than the title passage rule to apportion income and thus 
tax revenues to the jurisdiction providing the market for the goods.  Nonetheless, the 
delivery rule is far from foolproof because it does not in fact require taxpayers to trace 
goods to their ultimate destination.  Taxpayers remain able to arrange for products 
destined for consumers in high tax jurisdictions to be sold and shipped to unrelated 
intermediaries located in low tax jurisdictions.  Such sales would then be treated for tax 
purposes as having been made at the intermediary location.  Some jurisdictions have tried 
to counter taxpayer efforts to avoid the intent of the delivery rule through the 
interposition of intermediate destinations by adopting an “ultimate-destination” or 
“ultimately received” test for attribution purposes.118  Both of these tests look to the place 
at which the goods end up after all transportation has been completed.  Most jurisdictions, 
though, adopt the MTC position and require vendors to look only at the invoice address 
of its purchaser, to avoid introducing “time-consuming and burdensome complexities.”119  
These complexities may be substantial, particularly if the intermediary is an independent 
company.  Such companies may be less than willing to divulge their customer lists and 
                                                 
115 See Joann Martens Weiner, supra note 77, at 22-23. 
116 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (“a sale of personal property is consummated at the time when, and the 
place where, the rights, title, and interest of the seller in the property are transferred to the buyer”).  The 
title passage rule is widely understood to favor taxpayers, because they have almost complete flexibility 
when choosing where along the path of shipment to pass title to goods.  There is no necessary correlation 
between the use of the title passage rule and the maintenance (or not) of arm’s length, separate entity 
accounting; indeed, at various points in time, commentators have suggested replacing the U.S. title passage 
rule with a more substantive rule such as a delivery rule.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION, PROPOSALS ON 
UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES 
PERSONS 20-23 (1986) (discusses delivery rule, advocates place of sales activity test).  To the extent the 
benefits of moving to a formulary system are attributable to replacing the title passage rule with a place of 
delivery rule, the only benefit provided by the formulary method per se is the camouflage it provides for 
this change in source rules.  
117 It certainly results in a more accurate determination of the economic source of income attributable to the 
monopoly power conferred by a market state’s protection of intellectual property rights.  Whether a 
jurisdiction should be regarded as an economic source simply by virtue of having created conditions 
conducive to a market (regulation of the marketplace, sufficient protection of property rights and material 
wealth to create consumers) is perhaps more contestable. 
118 See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 75, ¶ 9.18[1][a] , at 9-185 - 9-
186. 
119 See id. at  9-185.  Even in these jurisdictions, however, there is usually an exception for “drop 
shipments,” where a manufacturer ships product directly to a retailer’s customer at the retailer’s request.  In 
such situations, despite some inconsistency with the actual statutory language, most states consider the 
goods sold in the state to which they were shipped notwithstanding the fact that the actual “purchaser” (the 
retailer) is located elsewhere. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 
667-669. Locating sales in a favorable jurisdiction entails some extra shipping and perhaps storage costs.  
Not all taxpayers are deterred by such costs, however, even when relatively low state taxes are at stake; 
since national tax rate differentials are higher, one would expect more taxpayers to take advantage of this 
tax minimization technique. 
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other sales data to their supplier, which is what is required for operation of an ultimate 
destination or ultimate receipt test.   
The problem with the rule for allocating services income is somewhat different.  
To a very large extent, the place of service test merely replicates the payroll factor120 and 
often results in little or no allocation to the market state. If the market state deserves some 
portion of the tax revenues in situations involving sales of tangible goods, the same 
concerns ought to justify a return from providing a market for services.121   The rule 
therefore should look at where the services generate benefits, a location that may be 
adduced by the location of the buyer,122 rather than where they were produced. 
Determining this location, however, may be quite difficult.  One could look to the 
address of the purchaser, but as is the case with tangible goods, there is no guarantee that 
the immediate purchaser is anything other than a middleman for some other, ultimate 
user.  And the tracing problems may be more significant in the services context than in 
the tangible goods context.123  Indeed, a good example of the practical impediments to 
such determinations are the problems of determining the location of digital downloads of 
information or other content.  Computers have a physical location, but vendors rarely 
know (or can check up) on them.  Often, they have only a billing address, which may or 
may not correspond to their customer’s business address.124     
But there is an even more serious problem with any source rule that looks to the 
location of the purchaser.  That problem is the jurisdictional problem:  what if the 
taxpayer’s only connection to the market jurisdiction is the customer?  If the taxpayer is 
not otherwise engaged in business in the market jurisdiction—if it is a “remote seller”—
the market jurisdiction may have no jurisdiction to tax the seller.  Apportioning income to 
the market jurisdiction then would be the equivalent of apportioning it to a no tax 
jurisdiction.  States of the United States that have encountered this problem have come up 
with two disparate solutions:  “throw out” and “throwback” rules.125  Under a “throw out” 
                                                 
120 The version of the test utilized in UDIPTA is actually somewhat worse, as it attributes such sales to the 
place the service providers perform the most work.  This “all-or-nothing approach” often produces 
“capricious and inequitable results” when services involve the expenditure of substantial amounts of time 
or costs in several different states.  1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 75, 
at 9-219.    
121 See id. at  9-220.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently 
announced the formation of a study group to review UDIPTA’s rule for sourcing  sales of services and 
intangibles.  Dolores W. Gregory, Formulary Apportionment in a Service Economy:  After 50 Years, Is 
UDIPTA in Need of an Overhaul?, 44 DAILY REPT. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) J-1 (March 7, 2007).   
122This suggestion would be consistent with the rule found in the U.S.-India Double Tax Convention, which 
(contrary to general U.S. practice) allocates the primary right to tax income derived from the performance 
of technological and other specialized services based on the location of the buyer rather than the place of 
performance.  However, unlike the situation covered by that treaty, some portion of the income would 
continue to be allocated to the performance state by virtue of the payroll factor. 
123 The classic quandary is where one sources a haircut performed in an airport barbershop:  the location of 
the shop, the purchaser’s residence, or where the purchaser happens to be traveling  “for the useful life of 
the haircut”?  See Dolores W. Gregory, supra note 121, at J-1.  This problem is replicated in the sales of 
goods setting when someone buys a product while away from home or on the way out of town. 
124 See Dolores W. Gregory, supra note 121, at J-2 (discussing Illinois rule). 
125 Although the “throw back” rule is enshrined in UDIPTA, not all states have adopted it.  See JEROME R. 
HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 667. The “throw out” rule was used in 
Pennsylvania until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “held that the tax administrator lacked authority under 
Pennsylvania’s version of UDIPTA to modify the state’s apportionment provisions in this fashion.”  Id. 
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rule, factors existing in states without taxing jurisdiction are simply ignored in 
constructing both the numerator and denominator of the apportionment formula.126  So, 
for example, if ABC Corporation has $100 million of sales, of which $20 million are mail 
order sales to customers located in states in which ABC Corporation has no other 
physical or economic connection and hence no taxing jurisdiction, the states with taxing 
jurisdiction would treat ABC Corporation as having only $80 million of sales for 
purposes of calculating their apportionable share of ABC Corporation’s taxable income.  
Under the “throw back” rule, by contrast, the sales to customers in non-jurisdictional 
states would be treated as sales made to customers in the state of origin or sometimes 
commercial domicile.127  If ABC Corporation shipped $20 million in goods from 
Delaware to Oregon, a state with no jurisdiction to tax ABC Corporation, Delaware’s 
sales factor would amount to actual Delaware sales (say $5 million) plus the $20 million 
of Oregon sales; Delaware would thus be treated as having 25/100, or ¼ of all sales.  
Both of these mechanisms result in apportioning all corporate income to a state with the 
jurisdiction to tax it.128  However, under the throw out mechanism, the nonjurisdictional 
“taxes” are spread among all jurisdictional states in proportion to their share of the factor, 
while under the throw back mechanism, only the state of origin (or domicile) picks up 
additional revenue from the factors located in nonjurisdictional states.  
Neither of these techniques works, though, if there are no jurisdictional states, that 
is, if none of the states operating the unitary, formulary taxing mechanism has 
jurisdiction to tax the income of ABC Corporation or its related entities.  And as the next 
section points out, the path to avoiding jurisdiction—and apportioning income to those 
jurisdiction avoiding locales--is often less arduous than one would hope. 
 
 2.  Jurisdiction 
Jurisdictional issues and enforcement issues go hand in hand.  The prevailing 
norm is that countries do not help other countries enforce their tax rules, except as 
specifically obliged under the terms of tax treaties—and then, usually only grudgingly so.  
Thus, it has never made much sense for countries to assert taxing jurisdiction in situations 
where they lack leverage over the taxpayer or their income.  Taxation based solely on 
source of income has always been particularly tenuous, given that the only method of 
collecting such a tax, withholding effected on gross income amounts, is a less than ideal 
taxing arrangement for business income.  For this reason, most countries do not try to 
assert taxing jurisdiction over business income unless and until the taxpayer engages in 
substantial business activities within their borders or, if covered by a treaty, maintains a 
permanent establishment there.  Restrictions on the taxing authority of states of the 
                                                 
126 See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN  AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, supra note 87, at 667. 
127 Id. at 666-67. 
128 Under the throw out mechanism, $80 million of $80 million in recognized sales will be apportioned 
among the taxing states.  Under the throw back mechanism,  $100 million in sales will be apportioned 
among states with taxing jurisdiction.  Of course, the actual amount of tax collected from the taxpayer may 
be different than the amount that would have been taxed if all states in which sales took place had 
jurisdiction to tax the resulting income, since there is no guarantee that the states to which such income is 
reapportioned under these mechanisms levy tax at the same rate as the nonjurisdictional states would have 
levied tax had they been able to exercise taxing jurisdiction.   
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United States come from the Constitution and federal legislation, and are less restrictive 
than the international norm.129    
There are two aspects of the jurisdictional issue.  One is the question of how much 
contact is required between a taxpayer and jurisdiction; the other is whether jurisdiction 
over one member of a group of related taxpayers confers jurisdiction over other members 
of the group.  The second question, which is dealt with first in this article, relates to the 
issue of unitariness. 
 
  a.  Unitary vs. Single Entity 
As explained earlier, there is no necessary connection between formulary taxation 
and unitary taxation.  Formulary accounting can be used to allocate the income of a single 
corporate (or noncorporate) taxpayer deriving income from multiple jurisdictions as 
easily (if not more easily) as the income from a group of related taxpayers.  However, 
failing to extend formulary accounting to all the component parts of an even partially 
vertically integrated business enterprise invites abuse.  A taxpayer can defeat the attempt 
to apportion income based on real economic factors by engaging in transactions with 
entities that fall outside the formulary base.  Once the taxpayer has diverted large 
amounts of income to that outside entity through transfer price manipulation or careful 
location of intangible assets, there may be relatively little income left in the jurisdictional 
entity’s income tax base for the formula to allocate.  In the United States, for example, 
large corporations strip operating subsidiaries of profits by having them make deductible 
payments of interest or royalties to corporate entities created in low tax jurisdictions.  
Though some of the affected states have attempted to fight back by, for example, denying 
deductions for royalty payments made to related companies,130 such ad hoc remedies are 
far from complete solutions.  Once one sort of payment becomes unavailable as a 
revenue-stripping device, taxpayers use another.  For example, it will be interesting to see 
if state legislatures feel as comfortable denying deductions for the cost of goods sold by 
related companies as they are with denying deductions for royalties or interest.131   
The successful operation of a formulary scheme thus requires that the formulary 
scheme reach all the actors in a vertically integrated enterprise, combining their income 
and factors for purposes of determining the amount of income earned from that enterprise 
in any particular jurisdiction.  However, successful operation of such a unified formulary 
method involves coping with some difficult design issues. 
The first of these issues is how to determine whether related entities are involved 
in an integrated, or unitary, business activity at all.  Not surprisingly, taxpayers often 
litigate over whether their particular business activities are unitary in nature.  Different 
states utilize different definitions of “unitary business.”  Some combine the income of all 
entities with sufficiently close ownership overlaps, while others look for a unity of 
ownership, operation and management, and still others for economic dependency, 
                                                 
129 Whether that will remain true is open to question.  Business groups have long sought a federal statute 
imposing a “uniform” jurisdictional standard that would condition taxation on the maintenance of  a fairly 
significant amount of physical presence within the state.  See Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State 
Business Activity Tax Nexus:  Revisiting Public  Law, 21 VA. TAX REV.  435, 500 & fn. 350 (2002); 
Charles E. McLure Jr. and Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State Taxation:  A Normative 
Analysis of Three Proposals, 102 TAX NOTES 1375, 1390 (2004). 
130 See Joann Martens-Weiner, supra note 6, at 83-84. 
131 Not all states are comfortable denying deductions even for interest and royalties expenses.  See id. 
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variously defined by flows of revenue or vertical integration.  The outcomes of these 
cases are very fact dependent, and frequently contestable. The choice between the various 
definitions is essentially one of rules versus standards, of bright lines (such as ownership 
interests) or more diffuse concepts such as economies of scale.  Like all rule/standard 
questions, there is no “correct” rule; the choice between the alternatives depends on the 
jurisdiction’s relative tastes for economic accuracy and simplicity.132 
The rules/standard dilemma extends not only to the choice of entities to subject to 
the formulary regime but also the income streams within those entities.  In the real world, 
many multinational corporations engage not only in vertically integrated operations but 
also in operations that may be quite economically distinct and even locally based.  This is 
of course also true in the multistate context; the classic (classroom) example is the 
corporation that operates both hotels and movie theaters.  There is no particular reason to 
believe that the returns on the hotel business correspond to the returns on the movie 
theater business, and particularly if the hotel business is restricted to some jurisdictions 
while the movie theaters are found in others, apportioning the combined income among 
the jurisdictions based on a mathematical formula that does not distinguish between the 
two businesses may lead to anomalous results, at least, results that appear far from those 
that would result from the proper allocation of the arm’s length method.  At the same 
time, opportunities for taxpayer misbehavior—in the form of disguising profits from one 
business as profits from the other—exist in the absence of formulary taxation; at the very 
least, taxpayers may try to strategically allocate various forms of management and 
supervisory expenses, interest expenses and other general corporate expenses, as well as 
the income from investments and working capital.  These opportunities exist whether the 
separate businesses are operated through separately incorporated entities or as branches 
of a single corporate entity.  Again, the state experience133 shows that if lines must be 
drawn between different income streams earned within a corporate taxpayer, with some 
subject to formulary apportionment and others not (or being subject to a different 
formulary apportionment), conflict between taxpayers and governments will result.  Full 
consolidation is easier though perhaps less economically accurate than allowing separate 
treatment of separate income streams from different lines of business.134 
The simplest approach, from an implementation standpoint, would seem to be to 
force total consolidation of the income and factors of entities sharing more than a 
specified overlap of ownership interests.  But forcing such consolidation may be far from 
easy because the further one extends the jurisdictional reach of  a formulary system, the 
more significant the coordination problems become. 
 
b.  The Coordination Problem 
                                                 
132 For an extended discussion of these issues, see I JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER HELLERSTEIN, 
supra note 75,  ¶¶ 8.09-8.11. 
133 For constitutional reasons, states of the United States can only apportion the income stream of 
businesses connected to their state.  They must separate out the income derived from movie theaters and the 
factors involved in producing that income when apportioning income in a jurisdiction outside the scope of 
that business.  See id. at. 8-59.  An explication of the disputes that have arisen in enforcing that rule can be 
found in id., at  8-62 – 8-213.  
134 Nor would it be entirely free of opportunities for taxpayers to engage in strategic behavior.  See Joann 
M. Weiner, supra note 74, at 29. 
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 Though it may be desirable to consolidate the income and factors of all related 
entities, discontinuities between the tax rules extant in the affected jurisdictions make 
such consolidation difficult and expensive.  As a mechanical matter, determining the 
overall tax base and the value of the economic factors requires merging information 
derived from all the affected jurisdictions.  If the information is collected using different 
definitions or standards, such mergers will require a country to accept considerable 
discontinuities in the data135 or require taxpayers to incur significant translation costs to 
get the data into the metric acceptable to that country.  And, of course, if there are several 
different countries maintaining different formulary taxing systems, taxpayers could find 
themselves in the position of having to translate the world-wide accounts of their 
combined business operations into several different (or many different) metrics.  Not only 
would this be extremely expensive, but the final result may be the under or over taxation 
of taxpayers due to differences between the definitional rules of the various affected 
countries.  Even the most fervent supporters of formulary taxation believe that it will not 
work without substantially greater tax harmonization than currently exists. 
Unfortunately, the institutional and political/economic barriers to effective 
coordination are substantial.  As detailed in an earlier article,136 both national legislatures 
and many taxpayers are natural opponents of attempts to unify the definition of taxable 
income, though for different reasons.  Legislatures would rightly see such unification as 
an attempt to strip them of authority to respond to localized political and economic 
imperatives with tax incentives or disincentives.  Taxpayers would also see coordination 
as a threat to their ability to influence tax rules and to take advantage of current 
inconsistencies in those rules. 
Moreover, coordination would be complex as an institutional matter.  
Coordination requires more than having the jurisdictions start out with the same rules; 
uniformity would have to be enforced with restrictions on future legislative action.  
Ideally, all statutory changes would have to be channeled through some multinational 
organization which would have the power to dictate rules for all participating countries.  
Further, coordination would have to exist at more than the level of statutory law.  To 
prevent disparities in implementation, international institutions would have to be created 
to interpret statutory language, adjudicate contested situations, and perform the audit 
function.  These institutions do not now exist, and their creation would come at some 
monetary and programmatic cost.137 
                                                 
135 Multinational taxpayers use the discontinuities that currently exist to reduce their overall income tax 
liabilities, in a phenomenon inaccurately entitled “international tax arbitrage.”  See, e.g., Mitchell Kane, 
Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L. J. 89, 92 
(2004); Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many:  Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 
B. C. L. REV. 79, 80 (2002); Daniel Shaviro, Money on the Table?:  Responding to Cross-Border Tax 
Arbitrage, 3 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 317, 321 (2002).  
136 See Julie A. Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. OF LEG. STUDIES S61 (2002). 
137 One question is whether the tax rules could be piggy-backed on top of the accounting rules, since the 
accounting profession is currently working towards a uniform set of internationally accepted standards.  See 
Wolfgang Schon, The Odd Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REV. 
111, 114 (2005).  Most large multinational corporations will have to adhere to this standard in order to be 
listed on desirable exchanges. See id.  There is a large literature on the desirability (or not) of unifying tax 
and accounting rules, see, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter 
Debate: Assessing the Proposed Section 475 Mark-To-Market Safe Harbor, 24 VA. TAX REV. 301, 351 
(2004); Michelle Hanlon, What Can We Infer About a Firm's Taxable Income From its Financial 
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Of course, total uniformity is not necessary for formulary taxation.  The tax 
statutes of the states of the United States differ in some respects.  Few continue to adhere 
strictly to the federal definition of taxable income.  Taxpayers seem able to cope with the 
discrepancies and make the adjustments necessary to the operation of a formulary system.  
However, it is easy to overstate the variation between the laws of the different states; in 
fact, few have wandered very far from the federal definition of taxable income, reducing 
the complexity of adjusting accounts determined under the laws of other states.  The 
differences between national definitions of taxable income tend to be much more 
profound and harder to adjust.  Indeed, it is for that precise reason that some of the 
proponents of the EU’s move towards formulary taxation suggest that it be calculated on 
a “water’s edge” basis, with only the income of entities incorporated in the EU  
apportioned on a formulary basis, and the income of related entities incorporated 
elsewhere continuing to be taxed on a separate entity, arm’s length basis.138  The EU, 
perhaps even more than the federal government, has the institutional power to encourage 
adherence by its member states to uniform definitions of income and economic factors.   
The problem with any water’s edge system is that taxpayers can try to divert 
income to entities resident in low tax jurisdictions lying beyond that edge.139 Although 
one response might be to simply extend the reach of the formulary regime to related 
entities located in known tax haven jurisdictions--some countries have used “white lists” 
and “black lists” which categorize particular countries for tax purposes140--putting 
together such a list will be difficult.  Defining a “low tax” jurisdiction is not all that easy.  
Often countries are low tax countries only in particular circumstances.  For example, 
countries which operate territorial tax systems may be regarded as “tax havens” for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Statements?, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 831 (2003); Alvin D. Knott and Jacob D. Rosenfeld, Book and Tax: A 
Selective Exploration of Two Parallel Universes (pts. 1 & 2), 99 TAX NOTES 865 (May 12, 2003), 99 TAX 
NOTES 1043 (May 19, 2003); Gil B. Manzon Jr. and George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial 
and Tax Reporting Measures of Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 175 (2002); Lillian F. Mills & George A. Plesko, 
Bridging the Reporting Gap: A Proposal for More Informative Reconciling of Book and Tax Income, 56 
NAT'L TAX J. 865 (2003); Alan B. Munro and Yoram Keinan, The Case for Book-Tax Conformity for Mark-
to-Market Valuation, 16 J. TAX'N FIN. INST. 5 (2003); Steven M. Rosenthal, Bank One, A Mark-to-Market 
Roadmap, 16 J. TAX'N FIN. INST. 18 (2003); Wolfgang Schon, supra; Wolfgang Schon, International 
Accounting Standards-A "Starting Point" for a Common European Tax Base?, 44 EUR. TAX'N 426 (2004);  
Sabine D. Selbach, The Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the European 
Community and their Interrelationship, 18 CONN. J.INT’L L. 523 (2003); Lee A. Sheppard, Financial 
Accounting Conformity: Not the Silver Bullet, 101 TAX NOTES 676 (Nov. 10, 2003), and there is no sense 
in trying to recapitulate it here.  I will simply note that the unification of the accounting rules is being 
undertaken by professional organizations, largely outside the political context, see Wolfgang Schon, supra , 
at 113, so that deferring to accounting rules would further remove tax decisions from the political realm.  
Though that might (or might not)  lead to better results overall, it surely will not be popular with those 
currently benefiting from governmental control of tax rules. 
138 The European Union Commission, for example, advocates formulary taxation of the EU profits of EU 
multinationals rather than a worldwide formulary approach.  Commentators applaud this restraint.  See, 
e.g., JOANN MARTENS-WEINER, supra  note 6, at 35;  Walter Hellerstein and Charles E. McClure Jr., supra 
note 6, at 206. 
139 They will also manipulate the factors to apportion income to low tax jurisdictions existing within the 
scope of the formulary regime, if there are any.  It is worth noting that Ireland lies within the EU. 
140 Montana, the only U.S. state which tries to impose its corporate income tax on entities incorporated 
outside the U.S., limits the reach of its taxing regime to entities incorporated in a specified list of low tax 
countries.  See Martin A. Sullivan, supra note 91, at 1024.  The Dorgan bill, described supra note 120, also 
contains a list of 40 “notable” tax haven countries. 
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income earned outside their borders, particularly if their source rules are easily 
manipulated, but given that most European nations operate territorial systems,141 it may 
be hard to justify adding a country to the list merely because it has a territorial system.  
Yet, for a taxpayer who earns large amounts of untaxed foreign source sales income, any 
territorial tax country constitutes a tax haven. This creates a second, political problem.  
How exactly will the disfavored countries (and therefore entities) be identified?  Political 
considerations have been know to overcome tax considerations in determining the 
content of such lists, decreasing their usefulness as anti-abuse mechanisms.  
Alternatively, countries might use some sort of “relative tax rate” test, similar to the one 
found in the current subpart F rules found in the Internal Revenue Code.  That test looks 
to see whether the foreign tax imposed on covered income equals 90 percent of the what 
the U.S. tax would have been if the income had been earned domestically.142  Because 
different countries impose different tax rates on corporate income, this sort of rule would 
likely lead to some entities being included in the forced combination for some countries’ 
tax purposes and not in others.143  How often this will occur, and the difficulties involved 
in “backing out” some entities from the combined tax base remains to be seen.  Of 
course, the same problem would arise if countries adopted different “white” and “black” 
lists. 
But the most serious problem with the inevitably “water’s edge” nature of any 
formulary system is that some companies, and perhaps many companies, will be able to 
avoid having any members of their corporate group, or any portion of their income, 
subject to the formulary regime.  They will do that by making sure that there are too few 
contacts between their operations and the members of the group of nations operating 
under the formulary system for jurisdiction to be established. 
 
c.  Jurisdictional Issues 
Like countries, the states of the United States have the jurisdiction to impose an 
income tax based on both residence and source.  Yet, apportionment of income to a 
jurisdiction under UDIPTA has never, in and of itself, been regarded as sufficient to 
confer taxing jurisdiction on a state.  The U.S. Constitution144 has been interpreted to 
require a more substantial “nexus” requirement before allowing taxation of such income.  
Countries are not bound by these constitutional strictures of course; nonetheless, as a 
matter of statutory and treaty law, most refrain from taxing nonresident individuals and 
entities on most forms of business income unless and until the taxpayer’s activities within 
the country are substantial enough to comprise a “trade or business” or (if a tax treaty 
                                                 
141 And indeed, the formulary method will in most cases be operated in the context of a territorial regime. 
142 Note that the test would have to look at the amount of tax accrued with respect to the particular income 
item, rather than the general corporate income tax rate.  A country with a high general tax rate and a 
territorial tax system would have a zero effective rate on foreign business income.  
143 In the case of the EU, Ireland would pose a particular problem.  Would a country be considered a tax 
haven only if its rate was significantly lower than Ireland’s—or would countries be free to set the definition 
of “low tax” with regard to their internal tax rates? 
144 The constitutional limitations have been buttressed by Congressional action, such as  the enactment in 
1959 of Public Law 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384.   This statute prohibits 
states from imposing net income taxes on an interstate business whose business activities within the state 
are limited to soliciting orders for the sale of personal property, as long as those orders are accepted or 
rejected outside the state and the goods are shipped from outside the state. 
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applies) the taxpayer has a “permanent establishment.”   To a large extent, these self-
imposed restrictions reflect the practical reality that there is no good method of collecting 
net income taxes on the business income of nonresident taxpayers with minimal ties to 
the jurisdiction.  A withholding tax based on gross income could be collected from 
domestic payors but such a tax could easily rise to extortionate levels, while the general 
norm against helping foreign countries enforce their income taxes would make 
enforcement of a tax on net income chancy at best.  These problems do not disappear  
with a switch to formulary taxation.  As a practical matter, it will still be difficult to 
obtain meaningful jurisdiction over business enterprises with minimal connections (other 
than income derived) from the U.S.  And indeed, the most likely scenario is a 
continuation of the current regime, which requires the maintenance of a permanent 
establishment as a precondition for levying tax on the domestically sourced business 
income of a nonresident taxpayer. 
Under the current system of separate entity, arm’s length accounting, it is very 
simple for foreigners to keep most of their income outside a jurisdictional nexus based on 
these rules.  All U.S. activities, for example, can be carried out through a U.S. subsidiary, 
while most income can be diverted to a related foreign corporation located in a tax haven 
country by careful manipulation of transfer prices or the ownership of assets or the 
location of business risks.145  Such a foreign entity’s income cannot be reached directly 
by the U.S. taxing authorities unless the U.S. corporation can be denominated an “agent” 
of the foreign entity; only then would  the U.S. entity’s activities be imputed to the 
foreign company so that it would be deemed engaged in a U.S. trade or business.  Tax 
treaties as well as U.S. statutes are quite specific in providing that mere commonality of 
ownership or vertical integration of the business enterprise is not enough to make the 
U.S. entity into an agent of the foreign entity.  If the entities are diligent in the 
formalities, making sure that neither entity signs contracts in the name of the other and 
the like, the U.S. entity will generally be considered an “independent agent” rather than a 
“dependent agent,” and thus will be prevented from imputing the U.S. entity’s offices and 
trade and business activities to the foreign relative.  
Moving from separate entity accounting to unitary accounting, forcing combined 
reporting on vertically integrated enterprises, would eliminate this easy escape.  As long 
as the U.S. had jurisdiction over one entity, it would be allowed to combine the income 
                                                 
145 The diversion of income from manufacturing operations and related know-how through the use of 
contract manufacturers was described supra TAN 54-57.  Income can be diverted away from sales 
operations through the use of “commissionaire arrangements.”  Like contract manufacturing arrangements, 
commissionaire structures were developed to help taxpayers avoid the reach of subpart F.  Rather than 
running their own retailing or wholesaling operations, foreign corporations set up subsidiaries to carry out 
such operations.  As in the contract manufacturing scenario, the subsidiary’s profit margin would be 
relatively small because the foreign parent would  retain most of the business risk, either by retaining 
ownership of the inventory until immediately prior to sale or by maintaining a generous return policy.  
Further, the foreign corporation may contract directly with third parties to perform advertising and other 
selling-associated functions.  As long as these third parties conform to the definition of independent agents, 
that is, as long as they formally act on behalf of their own trades or businesses rather than in the name of 
the foreign company, their actions and facilities are not imputed to the foreign corporation, which can 
continue to escape taxing jurisdiction in the sales state..  If the tax press can be believed, these structures 
are being successfully utilized by a number of taxpayers to avoid subpart F.  See  See Sandra P. McGill and 
Lowell D. Yoder, From Storefronts to Servers to Service Providers:  Stretching the Permanent 
Establishment Definition to Accommodate New Business Models, 81 TAXES  141,153 (2003).     
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and factors of all the related entities for purposes of determining the amount of tax owed.  
However, this would not mean that there would be no way to escape the U.S. (source) tax 
net, just that the escape is somewhat more complex. 
At present, most companies use related entities to carry out their business 
operations in high tax jurisdictions; because of the treaty rules, they need not fear that one 
company’s activities will be imputed to another, higher income, tax haven corporation.  
However, companies could substitute unrelated entities for related entities when carrying 
out operations in high tax—or formulary—states. Indeed, one of the original contract 
manufacturing cases, Ashland Oil,146 involved unrelated entities. The absence of an 
ownership relationship would make it much more difficult for countries to contend that a 
unitary business exists, and thus to reach the income of the low tax entity. The chain of 
vertical integration would be broken.  
But would many  multinational companies do this?  Would they be willing to 
substitute contractual controls for ownership simply to enjoy lower tax liability?  As tax 
scholars have recently pointed out, many tax obligations avoidable in theory are not in 
fact avoided.  For example, governments still seem to collect at least some tax revenues 
attributable to gains from risky activities, despite the finance literature that suggests how 
taxpayers could and should avoid such taxes.147  The feasibility of avoidance techniques 
depends on the extent of what one scholar calls “frictions”148 and another calls 
“deadweight losses” or “inefficiencies”149 that must be endured in order to obtain the 
desired tax results. The tax savings must outweigh the costs of achieving them for real 
world taxpayers to be find tax minimizing schemes attractive.  
The unanswered question is how many vertically integrated businesses will be 
willing to “deconstruct” in order to utilize commissionaire and contract manufacturing 
arrangements involving unrelated entities.  Such deconstruction may raise institutional 
and labor issues, not to mention intellectual property and quality control issues, which 
make generalization of this technique impossible.  But long ago, a very famous article 
about the nature of firms150 pointed out the interchangeability of contractual 
arrangements and vertical integration.  The possibility of large scale avoidance of 
national income taxes may provide enough of a financial incentive to reverse prior 
decisions in favor of vertical integration. And indeed, the fact that at least some contract 
manufacturer and commissionaire arrangements currently use unrelated operating entities 
to perform some related services151 suggest that the transactions costs are not insuperable. 
 Over time, then, formulary taxation may do less to raise revenues than to 
reorganize multinationals as much smaller tax haven corporations holding large amounts 
                                                 
146 See supra  note 57. 
147 See David Schizer, Balance In The Taxation of Derivative Securities:  An Agenda for Reform, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1891 (2004). 
148 See David Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1328 (2001). 
149 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORN. L. REV. 1627,  
1661 (1999) 
150See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,  in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:  ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter, eds. 1993), at 22 (explaining how levy of a 
sales tax might “bring into existence firms which otherwise would have no raison d’etre”).  Taxation could 
have the exact opposite effect. 
151 See Sandra P. McGill and Lowell D. Yoder, supra note 145, at 150; Stephen Shay, Exploring 
Alternatives to Subpart F,  82 TAXES 29, 34 (“it is readily possible to avoid involvement of a related party 
as a principal in a transaction if necessary to achieve the desired objective”). 
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of intellectual property and entering into elaborate contractual arrangements with 
unrelated companies owning physical business assets. 
This jurisdictional problem is not, of course, unique to a unified, formulary 
system.  It equally afflicts current arm’s length, separate accounting taxing mechanisms.  
Thus, shifting to a formulary method will not make the problem worse.  But the costs of 
shifting to a formulary system are substantial, and the scope of this problem suggests that 
the gains may not be. 
 
d.  Options for Going Forward 
Is there any way out of this conundrum?  Or is the income tax on a slow (or not so 
slow) march towards irrelevance? The question boils down to whether countries, 
particularly high tax countries, can effectively cast a wider jurisdictional net.  They could 
do this in one of two ways.  First, they could extend their ability to claim jurisdiction over 
business profits or proceeds on the basis of agency relationships.  In particular, they could 
begin imputing corporate presence of foreign entities on the basis of business 
arrangements entered into with a broader range of domestic agents, including 
independent agents.  Second, they could extend gross basis taxation of income derived by 
nonresident taxpayers, not only reversing the current trend towards diminution of such 
taxation but extending its scope to cover new sorts of proceeds.152  Neither of these 
options is foolproof or even particularly attractive, but ultimately the question is whether 
the alternative of nontaxation is worse. 
The commissionaire and contract manufacturing structures eliminate taxation of 
the foreign entity because the current tax rules refuse to impute the existence of a 
“permanent establishment,” the predicate for taxation of business profits, from the 
domestic presence of either an independent agent, or even a dependent agent that fails to 
conclude contracts in the name of the principal.  These rules could be changed.  At their 
most draconian, the rules could be amended to provide that any contractual arrangement 
with a domestic business enterprise would be treated as an agency relationship conferring 
permanent establishment based jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.  However, 
exercising that jurisdiction would be difficult because of the absence of physical control 
over the foreign company.  In the absence of much more extensive multilateral 
cooperation than currently exists,153 the country attempting to exercise jurisdiction would 
have to do so out of monies paid to the foreign company by the domestic agent/payor.  
When the domestic agent/payor is an unrelated company, it is highly unlikely that it 
would be in a position to calculate the foreign principal’s tax on a net income basis; the 
tax thus would have to be withheld on the basis of gross income or gross sales proceeds.  
This gross basis tax could be a preliminary rather than a “final” tax obligation.  That is, 
the foreign company could be allowed to submit a return after the fact, setting forth its 
tax obligation as calculated in accordance with regular tax rules, just as individual 
taxpayers are required to do in conjunction with employer withholding.  However, the 
problems of auditing the foreign income, deductions and factors of a foreign company 
would remain.  Or, to put it another way, the effect of imposing net income tax in such a 
situation would be the same as eliminating the purported “water’s edge” nature of the 
                                                 
152 Both of these changes would require revisions in current tax treaty arrangements. 
153 And there is no reason to believe such cooperation will be forthcoming in the future, as it will definitely 
be against the interests of the countries in which the foreign businesses are “resident.” 
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formulary system.  If the proponents of formulary taxation are correct in their analysis 
that water’s edge is necessary, net income taxation of these offshore corporations will not 
be possible, and only gross basis taxation would be a possibility. 
The practical import of such a jurisdictional change would thus mimic the 
practical effects of the second option of imposing a source based withholding tax not only 
on the traditional forms of “passive” investment income (interest, rents and royalties) but 
also on business income such as sales and services income.154  The rate of this 
withholding tax would not, of course, have to match the current statutory withholding 
rates; if business income is assumed to have more significant associated expenses, a 
lower withholding tax rate might be appropriate. 
 But in the final analysis, a gross withholding tax is still a gross withholding tax, 
leaving open the possibility of either confiscatory or insufficient taxation, at least if a 
polity desires to levy a tax based on income.  In fact, such a taxing system would look 
(and possibly operate) a great deal like the current border-adjusted value added tax 
systems.  The result would be that internally produced and consumed goods and services 
would be subject to a net basis income tax, while imported goods and services would be 
subject to a gross basis value added tax.   
 Whether corporate taxpayers would prefer to pay the gross basis tax or the net 
basis tax would, undoubtedly, depend on both the relative tax rates and their particular 
circumstances.   Since taxpayers control the corporate structure which will determine 
which of these taxes they will be subject to, they will undoubtedly elect into their 
preferred tax regime.   
It is worth noting that all of these changes can be made as easily (which is not 
easily at all!) outside the context of a switch to formulary taxation as within it.  In the 
final analysis, if countries are willing to make such changes, the choice between 
formulary and arm’s length accounting may be relatively unimportant.  The real problem 
with the current rules for the taxation of international transactions, in short, is less one of  
transfer pricing than of jurisdiction.  If the jurisdictional flaws are solved, any taxing 
system will work (at least somewhat).       
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Although taxes are the price of civilization, most people and companies want the 
civilization without the taxes.  Multinational corporations, in the view of many, have 
been all too successful at achieving this desired state.  Formulary taxation has been touted 
as a mechanism for making sure that they pay their fair share.  Unfortunately, even the 
best designed formulary system will be incapable of living up to its billing.  Indeed, it 
                                                 
154 As a technical matter, the latter approach would also require changes in the substance of source rules, to 
source income at the location of the purchaser of the goods and services rather than the location of the “sale 
of goods” or “place of performance” for services.  A third method of arriving at almost the same place 
would be to deny  domestic purchasers deductions for purchases from foreign countries.  This would have 
the effect of  inflating the purchasers’ income by an amount corresponding to the amount escaping source 
country tax in the hands of the nonresident seller.  Both states of the United States and foreign countries 
have (at various times) disallowed deductions for certain expenses paid to related “foreign” companies.   
The difference between these alternatives (withholding tax versus deduction loss) lies in rate differentials 
(the marginal tax rate of the purchaser versus a statutory withholding rate) and the possible availability of a 
tax credit on the seller’s end (possible for a withholding tax, not for a lost deduction, since the tax would 
not be “levied” on the foreign taxpayer). 
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remains open to question whether formulary taxation will be even a net improvement 
over the present arms’ length pricing method based system (at least, outside the EU, in 
jurisdictions without an ECJ busy striking down antiabuse rules that keep separate 
accounting methods from collapsing).   Unfortunately for governments, the adoption of 
formulary taxation will not even require the development of new avoidance methods, just 
an expansion of  methods already employed by some of the very taxpayers against which 
the new taxing rules would be aimed.  The solution to the problem of taxing income 
derived from international transactions, alas, may have to come from another direction 
altogether.  And the solutions available from that direction are not particularly palatable.       
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